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Environment, Mobility, and International Law:
A New Approach in the Americas
David James Cantor

Abstract
The role of international law in regulating international movement in the context of global
environment change and hazards remains a topic of intense debate among both legal scholars and
practitioners. Yet, as this Article shows, we have largely reached the limits of what existing
international law methods and approaches can tell us about the future of the law in this area. By
contrast, this Article draws on a detailed regional case study to offer a distinct perspective to that
ongoing debate about the role and future of international law. Against the backdrop of emerging
patterns of mobility linked to devastating environmental disasters in the Americas, this Article
derives new legal insights from in-depth analysis of a developing body of comparative and
international legal practice by countries from across this key region.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Global society appears ever more conscious of how environmental
phenomena shape human mobility.1 The immobility enforced on populations by
lockdowns in many countries as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic is only
the most recent example. Yet environmental threats can also help to push the
movement of persons. For example, in the context of climate change, the wellpublicized risk posed to the ongoing viability of human settlement of small islands
in the Pacific Ocean by rising sea levels fuels globalized concern that their
populations will end up as “climate refugees.”2 This long-term “sinking” Pacific
island scenario is but one of many scenarios where movement is shaped by
environmental processes. Some reflect hazards that are more sudden-onset in
character. For example, in the Americas, as recently as 2017, around 160,000
inhabitants of Puerto Rico fled to the United States mainland after the sudden
devastation wrought on that island by Hurricane Maria, some temporarily and
others on a more permanent basis.3 Indeed, a diverse range of environmental
threats generates a far-reaching mobility impact on populations across the world.
These are global challenges, both in the sense that few countries are immune to
their effects and also in that such environmental phenomena and their
consequences do not respect the territorial boundaries claimed by nation states,
and they are often cross-border in nature.
The risks posed by such environmental phenomena, especially in the context
of a process of global climate change, have prompted attempts by states, civil
society, and other actors to coordinate international action. This includes efforts
to develop appropriate structures of international law in such fields as climate
change mitigation and adaptation and also disaster risk management. More
recently, normative frameworks in each of these fields have begun to directly
acknowledge the human mobility dimensions of these environmental phenomena.
Most prominently, under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change,4 the 2010 Cancun Agreement invites states to “enhance
understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change

1

The term “mobility” is used here to signal an emphasis on agency in movement, in other words,
not only the act of movement itself but also the wider capacity to move, and to attempt to avoid
importing implicit value judgments as to the voluntary or involuntary nature of such movement
that are often implicit in the use of terms such as “migration” or “displacement.”

2

For a critical perspective, see Carol Farbotko & Heather Lazrus, The First Climate Refugees? Contesting
Global Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu, 22 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 382 (2012).

3

JENNIFER HINOJOSA & EDWIN MELÉNDEZ, CENTER FOR PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, PUERTO RICAN
EXODUS: ONE YEAR SINCE HURRICANE MARIA (2018), https://perma.cc/T3ZH-TW53.

4

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No, 10238, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, at 5.
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induced displacement, migration and planned relocation.”5 Likewise, in the
disaster risk management field, the non-binding 2015 Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction calls on states to address “disaster-induced human
mobility,” including by “transboundary cooperation.”6
Up to this point, the global frameworks calling for cooperation on human
mobility challenges in the context of environmental threats offer little guidance
on the form that such responses should take.7 In this regard, a largely blank canvas
appears to exist, waiting for legal development. Yet, as this Article will show, a
long-standing parallel body of legal research and debate seeks to fill this apparently
blank canvas. Based on a preoccupation that existing international law does not
adequately protect people who leave their countries due to environmental push
factors, particularly those linked to climate change, these international law studies
already articulate a diverse range of innovative potential solutions to this perceived
gap in the law.8 They are complemented by the small number of extant judicial
decisions that explore how existing international law rules on refugee status and
human rights protection might apply to such scenarios.9 Overall, this body of
5

A Displacement Task Force was also created under the UNFCCC Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts in 2015. See 2010
Cancun Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. Yet, while climate-related mobility has
become increasingly embedded as a topic of concern within the UNFCCC loss and damage
mechanism, some suggest that its placement there may actually weaken efforts to promote climaterelated mobility as a standalone issue and to develop consensus on responses, due to the
particularities of that mechanism. See generally Chloé Anne Vlassopoulos, When Climate-Induced
Migration Meets Loss and Damage: A Weakening Agenda-Setting Process?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 376 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017).

6

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/224/CRP.1,
⁋ 28, ⁋ 30. Yet, while subsequent policy developing this DDR framework acknowledges the number
of “permanently displaced people” as a potential indicator for the “human impact” and “economic
impact” of a disaster, specific guidance on measures to respond to such impact remains lacking. See,
e.g., U.N. OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, WORDS INTO ACTION GUIDELINES, (2017),
https://perma.cc/UTF7-JAXK.

7

See supra notes 5–6.
The parallel literature on the mandate and role of institutions at the international level will not be
addressed here except as it bears on the question of international law development on the status of
affected persons. See, e.g., SINJA HANTSCHER, THE UNHCR AND DISASTER DISPLACEMENT IN THE
21ST CENTURY: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (2019); NINA HALL, DISPLACEMENT,
DEVELOPMENT, AND CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MOVING BEYOND
THEIR MANDATES (2016); ANDREA C. SIMONELLI, GOVERNING CLIMATE INDUCED MIGRATION
AND DISPLACEMENT: IGO EXPANSION AND GLOBAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2015);
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION (Kerstin Rosenow-Williams &
François Gemenne eds., 2016).

8

9

See, for example, the national judicial decisions on how international refugee law concepts are to
be interpreted in relation to claims for asylum by persons fleeing climate change or disasters,
including the Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of New Zealand. See Canada
(Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; Teitiota v. Chief Executive of the Ministry of
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scholarly insight and creative thinking represents a rich resource for states and
other international actors as they consider how the global response to human
mobility in the context of environmental threats might be further developed in
the face of evidence that global warming is accelerating rapidly.
This Article contributes to this topical international law debate by offering a
new perspective rooted in empirical evidence and legal practice from the region
of the Americas. It starts by highlighting key features of the existing legal literature
on what we might call the “environment-mobility” nexus (Section II).10 It shows
that most legal studies adopt a particular approach, focusing on how international
law, usually at the global level, could be developed to address a perceived gap in
protection for people who are displaced to other countries due to environmental
push factors. However, it contends that we have largely reached the limits of what
that methodology can tell us about the current or future role of law in this area. It
suggests that studying the legal issues as they play out in practice in one specific
region provides a useful complementary perspective. Moreover, as a region, the
Americas offer a useful counterpoint to emerging legal scholarship with a regional
focus on the sinking islands in the Pacific.11 Section II leads us not only to revisit
certain widely held assumptions in the existing legal literature but also to
reconsider the likely pathways for future development of international law in this
field.
This Article continues by evaluating international mobility linked to
environmental factors in the Americas to gain a sharper empirical understanding
of where exactly the law might usefully act in this region (Section III). It then
challenges the widely held assumption that states lack the legal tools to respond

10

11

Business, Innovation and Employment, [2015] NZSC 107. The application of international human
rights as protection against refoulement in the context of climate change was recently addressed by
the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC). See Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (2020).
Benoît Mayer and François Crépeau coined the idea of a “climate-mobility nexus.” That of an
“environment-mobility nexus” encapsulates a similar understanding that human mobility can be
shaped in many different ways, and often indirectly, by environmental factors more broadly and
not just climate change. Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau, Introduction to RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 1 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017).
This study thus develops the relatively sparse legal literature on this topic in the Americas as a
region. See DAVID JAMES CANTOR, PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, CROSS-BORDER
DISPLACEMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTERS: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (2018),
https://perma.cc/D6NE-DCFC [hereinafter CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT]; Erika
Pires Ramos & Fernanda de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville, Regional Responses to Climate Change and
Migration in Latin America, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE
LAW, supra note 10, at 262; NICOLÁS RODRÍGUEZ SERNA, NANSEN INITIATIVE, HUMAN MOBILITY
IN THE CONTEXT OF NATURAL HAZARD‑RELATED DISASTERS IN SOUTH AMERICA (2015),
https://perma.cc/X7HJ-38ZP; DAVID JAMES CANTOR, NANSEN INITIATIVE, LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE CONCERNING THE HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION OF ALIENS ON A TEMPORARY BASIS IN
THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS (2015), https://perma.cc/2ETM-8NTT [hereinafter CANTOR, LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE].
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to such mobility by illustrating how pertinent provisions exist, and are used for
that purpose in practice, by many states in the Americas. Crucially, such provisions
are found less in refugee and human rights law on “international protection”
(Section IV) than in immigration law (Section V). The analysis of how states
actually approach the issue in practice is helpful in that it adds an understanding
not only of where international rules may be needed but also the specific form
that they might take. The Article also shows how these understandings are being
actively promoted by intergovernmental bodies at the subregional level in the
Americas (Section VI). On the environment-mobility nexus, the findings support
the view that the international law predicament will be resolved not by producing
new legal or analytical concepts but by thinking differently about existing concepts
(Section VII).12

II. T HE E NVIRONMENT -M OBILITY N EXUS AS A L EGAL
P ROBLEM
Legal scholarship is increasingly preoccupied with the challenge posed to
human mobility by climate change and other environmental factors. Students of
international law, in particular, have led this debate, and most legal studies pursue
the inquiry in terms of international law.13 On its face, the fact that international
law is at the core of this research agenda is hardly surprising. Indeed, climate
change, the environment, and human mobility are all global phenomena and thus
seem appropriate topics for international law. Yet many legal studies are rooted in
highly particular assumptions about the nature of both the underlying empirical
phenomena and the resulting legal problem. This Section illustrates these
assumptions by sketching out some of the main areas of legal debate. In this
regard, it does not claim to be a comprehensive survey of the burgeoning literature
on this topical concern. Rather, it builds on critical review of the existing legal
scholarship to elucidate where and how a case study of the region of the Americas
might advance the wider legal debate in this field.

12

13

Calum T.M. Nicholson, ‘Climate-Induced Migration’: Ways Forward in the Face of an Intrinsically Equivocal
Concept, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 10,
at 49, 50. In this sense, it is not a “new” challenge needing “new” responses. See Etienne Piguet,
Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire, Migration and Climate Change, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 1, 24 (Etienne Piguet et al. eds., 2011).
However, a couple of studies examine the issue in relation to the national law or policy of one
country. See, e.g., Eric Omeziri & Christopher Gore, Temporary Measures: Canadian Refugee Policy and
Environmental Migration, 29 REFUGE 43 (2014); Chelsea Krombel, The Prospective Role of Temporary
Protected Status: How Discretionary Designation Has Hindered the United States’ Ability to Protect Those
Displaced by Environmental Disaster, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 153 (2012).
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A. Understanding the Empirical Phenomenon
The underlying empirical phenomenon is described using diverse
overlapping and often competing terms, each loaded with assumptions about how
states should respond.14 However, “[w]e should not be distracted by semantic
discussions with little practical meaning about whether to call affected persons
‘climate change refugees’, ‘environmental migrants’ or something else.”15 Rather,
analyses must focus on how the broad nexus between “environment” and
“mobility” is constituted empirically across a range of contexts and forms.
Although a paucity of robust empirical studies on this nexus was long a cause for
concern,16 the evidence base has begun to expand over the last decade or so.17 In
tandem, while the superficial engagement of many legal scholars with this
empirical evidence is regularly criticized,18 a growing number are now reflecting
more seriously on the empirical research and its potentially far-reaching
implications for understanding the role of law in this context. As a result, several
important discussions about the empirical nature of the environment-mobility
nexus can now be discerned as pertinent to shaping the approach and direction of
legal studies.
Firstly, on the nature of the nexus between mobility and environmental
factors, most legal studies frame it in terms of a causal relationship.19 Moreover,
in general, these legal studies are concerned with causality in one direction only—
in other words, environmental change as a cause of movement (although
migration as a cause of environmental change is also considered by the social
sciences).20 Likewise, the legal literature focuses squarely on adverse
environmental conditions as a “push” factor prompting people to leave the
country of origin. Especially in the climate change context, it frames the resulting
mobility as a new challenge, although environmental adversity and change have
14
15

16

Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 17–21.
Walter Kälin, The Climate Change-Displacement Nexus, BROOKINGS (July 16, 2008),
https://perma.cc/JB4H-G9HL.
Dominic Kniveton, Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk, Christopher Smith & Richard Black, Climate Change
and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows, 32–33 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION
MIGRATION RSCH. SERIES 1 (2008).

17

Stephen Castles, Concluding Remarks on the Climate Change-Migration Nexus, in MIGRATION
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 415, 419–22.

18

This critique has been advanced by many scholars within and outside the field. See, e.g., Benoît
Mayer, Who Are “Climate Refugees”? Academic Engagement in the Post-truth Era, in CLIMATE REFUGEES:
BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 89, 94 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018); Richard Black,
Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality? 1 (Univ. of Sussex, Working Paper No. 34, (2001),
https://perma.cc/W3T4-X9XF.
See generally Calum T.M. Nicholson, Climate Change and the Politics of Causal Reasoning: The Case of Climate
Change and Migration, 180 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 151 (2014).
See, e.g., RICHARD BLACK, REFUGEES, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1998).

19

20
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probably shaped human mobility throughout history.21 Yet this primary interest in
how environmental conditions act as a “push” factor for mobility has led legal
researchers to overlook other pertinent ways in which environmental change can
shape the experience of human mobility, including as a “pull” factor for migrants
(as for example, in places where new economic opportunities emerge as a result
of certain climate change impacts).22
Secondly, on the content of this causal nexus, legal scholars often adopt an
“alarmist” or “maximalist” understanding of “environmental migration.”23
Rooted in natural sciences and security studies, this view uses deductive methods
to forecast vast future waves of migration driven by environmental change.24 The
approach posits the nexus in mono-causal terms, with environmental factors
acting as the sole drivers of predicted movement. However, empirical evidence
from local level studies in the social sciences instead points to the multi-causal
nature of migration and shows how environmental change is often just one of
many interconnected factors influencing mobility.25 On this basis, “skeptical” or
“minimalist” scholars have argued that, empirically, environmental factors cannot
be isolated as a primary driver of movement, questioning whether “environmental
migration” really exists as distinct phenomenon.26 Others, though, attempt to
transcend the divide by analyzing environmental factors as a proximate cause of
movement that, even if it does interact with other factors, may produce distinct
forms of mobility, as in circumstances of sudden or extreme environmental

21

ANTHONY PENNA, THE HUMAN FOOTPRINT: A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 4–8, 56–58,
106–7 (2d ed. 2014). Indeed, environmental factors have been recognized by migration theories as
early as the 1880s, although they only made a resurgence in the 1980s after references to them
dwindled during much of the twentieth century. See Etienne Piguet, From “Primitive Migration” to
“Climate Refugees”: The Curious Fate of the Natural Environment in Migration Studies, 103 ASS’N. AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 148 (2013).

22

BENOÎT MAYER, THE CONCEPT OF CLIMATE MIGRATION: ADVOCACY AND ITS PROSPECTS 22–25
(2016).

23

See François Gemenne, How They Became the Human Face of Climate Change: Research and Policy Interactions
in the Birth of the “Environmental Migration” Concept, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note
12, at 225, 230–39.
See, e.g., NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, ENVIRONMENTAL EXODUS: AN EMERGENT CRISIS IN
THE GLOBAL ARENA (1995).
See Marion Borderon et al., Migration Influenced by Environmental Change in Africa: A Systematic Review of
Empirical Evidence, 41 DEMOGRAPHIC RSCH. 491 (2019); Stephen Castles, Environmental Change and
Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate 1 (Oxford, Working Paper No. 70, 2002),
https://perma.cc/W7X9-NM7R. See generally JoAnn McGregor, Refugees and the Environment, in
GEOGRAPHY AND REFUGEES: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES OF CHANGE 157 (Richard Black &
Vaughan Robinson eds., 1993).
See, e.g., Castles, supra note 25; Black, supra note 18; William B. Wood, Ecomigration: Linkages Between
Environmental Change and Migration, in GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL REFUGEES: PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS 42 (Aristide R. Zolberg & Peter M. Benda eds., 2001).

24

25

26

270

Vol. 21 No. 2

Environment, Mobility, and International Law

Cantor

change.27 As the empirical evidence base grows, this approach seems to be gaining
increasing acceptance.28
Such debate about the multi-causal nature of migration has crucial
implications for legal scholarship. Certainly, empirical evidence of the multi-causal
reality of movement suggests that the legal studies that adopt a mono-causal
understanding of this nexus adopt a faulty premise. This view matters because the
perception of a gap in legal protection in fact emerged from the “maximalist”
literature that assumes a distinct class of migrants forced to leave their homes as
a result of environmental change can be identified for the purpose of intervention.
However, even for those legal studies that frame environmental factors as but one
proximate cause of movement in this context, the question of how to
accommodate the multi-causal nature of such mobility persists. On the one hand,
it poses the question of just how proximate such environmental factors need to
be in order to be treated as a legally significant “cause” of movement. On the
other hand, given that vulnerability to environmental threats is mediated by social,
political, and economic factors,29 an important question also arises about the
extent to which such human factors can or should be accommodated in law.30
Thirdly, many legal scholars frame the “environment” side of the nexus
explicitly in terms of “climate change.”31 For some, this is a strategic gambit to
raise the profile of the issue by linking it to powerful discourses on climate
change.32 For others, it is a matter of global justice that responsibility for resettling
poor people forced out of their homes in the Global South should fall on the
states in the Global North that contribute most to global warming.33 Yet this
27

See, e.g., ASTRI SUHRKE, PRESSURE POINTS: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, MIGRATION AND
CONFLICT (1993); Graeme Hugo, Environmental Concerns and International Migration, 301 INT’L
MIGRATION REV. 105 (1996).

28

Castles, supra note 25, at 419–24; Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 5.
Robert McLeman, Climate-Related Migration and its Linkages to Vulnerability, Adaptation, and SocioEconomic Inequality: Evidence from Recent Examples, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 29; Mike Hulme, Attributing Weather Extremes to “Climate
Change”: A Review, 38 PROGRESS PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 499 (2014); Kniveton et al., supra note 16.
For instance, some scholars have argued that underlying processes of discrimination in the social
construction of vulnerability raise the prospect that affected persons may have a claim to refugee
status. See, e.g., MATTHEW SCOTT, CLIMATE CHANGE, DISASTERS, AND THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
(2020); Bruce Burson, Environmentally Induced Displacement and the 1951 Refugee Convention: Pathways to
Recognition, in ENVIRONMENT, FORCED MIGRATION AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITY 3 (Tamer Afifi &
Jill Jäger eds., 2010).
Gemenne, supra note 23, at 225.

29

30

31
32
33

MAYER, supra note 22, at 43–47.
Maxine Burkett, Justice and Climate Migration: The Importance of Nomenclature in the Discourse on TwentyFirst-Century Mobility, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra note 18, at 73;
Giovanni Bettini, Sarah Louise Nash & Giovanna Gioli, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Fading
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approach poses challenges for legal analyses. For instance, global warming seems
to act on mobility by influencing more “proximate” environmental drivers, such
as storms, drought, or desertification. If it is already difficult to empirically isolate
the role of such proximate environmental factors in pushing migration in any
specific case, then climate change adds an additional layer of complexity, as it sits
one step behind those drivers (and two if the link to human activities as a cause
of climate change is also to be made).34 Establishing the respective contribution
to climate change of particular states adds a third additional layer of complexity.35
Despite these challenges, even some of those scholars who recognize the “multicausality” of migration end up proposing solutions for “climate migrants” as if
they were a definite and identifiable group of persons.36
Yet, even if such factual and legal determinations were possible in particular
cases, this emphasis on climate change alone has other conceptual limitations.
Indeed, as a “push” factor for mobility, it is not clear that the impact of climaterelated phenomena, which could be influenced by global warming, differs
substantially from that of other environmental phenomena, such as volcanoes or
earthquakes.37 Moreover, even for climate related “push” factors such as storms
or flooding, it is not obvious how events caused, or exacerbated, by climate change
can be distinguished, in terms of their impact on human mobility, from those that
are not.38 For these reasons, some legal studies have instead sought to frame this
side of the nexus in terms of broader concepts of the “environment.”39 Particularly
since the late 2000s, scholars and policymakers have increasingly conceptualized
the environment side of the nexus more broadly in terms of disasters, an approach
that obviates many of the flaws of focusing solely on “climate change.”40 Indeed,
Contours of (In)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration, 2 GEOGRAPHIC J. 348 (2016); François
Gemenne, One Good Reason to Speak of ‘Climate Refugees’, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 70 (2015);
LAURA WESTRA, SATVINDER JUSS & TULLIO SCOVAZZI, TOWARDS A REFUGEE ORIENTED RIGHT
OF ASYLUM (2015).
34

Walter Kälin, Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 81, 85 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010).

35

Moreover, even if the contribution of particular states to climate change could be characterized as
internationally wrongful acts under international law, others argue that the principle of reparation
in the law of state responsibility does not extend to a duty on responsible states to adopt particular
policies in relation to climate migration, such as resettlement of affected individuals. See Benoít
Mayer, Climate Change, Migration and the Law of State Responsibility, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, 238.

36

Mayer, supra note 18, at 97.
MAYER, supra note 22, at 12.

37
38
39
40

Id. at 26.
Id. at 12–16.
Kälin, supra note 34, at 85; MAYER, supra note 22, at 12–16 (arguing that, conceptually, “climate
migration” is a component of “environmental migration” and cannot, and should not, be addressed
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disasters are widely understood as encompassing both sudden- and slow-onset
events and also as constituted not only by the manifestation of hazardous events
but also by societal vulnerability to those hazards.41 On this approach, climate
change remains relevant but takes a background role in causal terms, as a process
that may exacerbate more immediate climate-related hazards in particular
contexts.42
The “disaster” concept usefully foregrounds the more proximate
environmental factors influencing human mobility. Yet it also raises questions.
Crucially, different definitions of the disaster concept exist, despite a similar
overall approach.43 Even the widely used U.N. definition has particularities that
need consideration in the mobility context. For instance, while it recognizes that
a hazard need not have the potential for collective impact,44 it requires that a
“hazardous event” result in a serious collective impact in order to qualify as a

41

in isolation). Some also raise the fear that states have proved resistant to addressing problems
framed in terms of climate change. See, e.g., Michel Prieur, Towards an International Legal Status of
Environmentally Displaced Persons, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra note
18, at 233, 241; JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 240 (2012)
For instance, U.N. policy defines a “disaster” as “[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a
community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of
exposure, vulnerability, and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material,
economic and environmental losses and impacts.” A sudden-onset disaster is one “triggered by a
hazardous event that emerges quickly or unexpectedly” while a slow-onset disaster “emerges
gradually over time.” See, e.g., U.N. Gen. Assembly, Rep. of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental
Expert Working Group on Indicators and Terminology Relating to Disaster Risk Reduction, U.N.
Doc. A/71/644, 13 (2016) [hereinafter U.N. Report]. In short, disasters are never solely
“environmental” or “natural” in character but equally reflect societal vulnerabilities to hazards that
may be “natural” or “man-made.” See also ILAN KELMAN, DISASTER BY CHOICE: HOW OUR ACTIONS
TURN NATURAL HAZARDS INTO CATASTROPHES (2020).

42

“A changing climate leads to changes in the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing
of extreme weather and climate events, and can result in unprecedented extreme weather and
climate events.” INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MANAGING THE RISKS OF
EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 7 (2012). See also
Martine Rebetez, The Main Climate Change Forecasts that Might Cause Human Displacements, in
MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 37.

43

The different approaches reflect consensus that disasters result from the interaction between
hazards and societal resilience to them but differ in other material aspects. For instance, compare
the widely-endorsed U.N. definition of the “disaster” concept, supra note 41, to that developed by
the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) for its Emergency Events
Database (EM-DAT), and apparently still used by the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies, which defines a disaster as a “[s]ituation or event, which overwhelms local
capacity, necessitating a request to national or international level for external assistance . . .; An
unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering.”
Glossary, EM-DAT, https://perma.cc/4K6R-U8TY.
The U.N. approach defines a “hazard” as a “process, phenomenon or human activity that may
cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption
or environmental degradation.” U.N. Report, supra note 41, at 18.
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“disaster.”45 But do people really move in response only to “disasters” or do they
also move because of perceived hazards? And which concept should we favor?
Moreover, each rendering of the disaster concept also differs in how it classifies
different hazards in terms of both their origins46 and types.47 For our purposes,
this may complicate efforts to identify which particular hazards are to be treated
as “environmental” in character (and whether by reference to origins or type).48
Indeed, the most consistent approach may be simply to treat all of the identified
hazard types as essentially “environmental.”49
Lastly, some scholars have expressed concern that the “disaster”-based
approach risks introduce a false binary between slow- and sudden-onset events,
which might end up privileging more easily identifiable sudden-onset disasters and
temporary forms of protection when more durable solutions could be required in

45

The U.N. approach defines a “hazardous event” as the “manifestation of a hazard in a particular
place during a particular period of time.” U.N. Report, supra note 41, at 20.

46

The U.N. approach views the origins of hazards as, respectively, “natural, anthropogenic or
socionatural” locating both environmental degradation and climate change in the last category. U.N.
Report, supra note 41, at 18. By contrast, the CRED approach distinguishes between “natural” and
“technological or man-made” hazards, locating environmental degradation under the latter, but
treating climate change as an “aggravating factor.” See Types of Disasters: Definition of Hazard, IFRC,
https://perma.cc/K5AR-YLJX.

47

Alongside “technological or man-made” hazards (that include environmental degradation and
pollution), the CRED approach sub-divides the hazards of “natural” origin into geophysical,
hydrological, climatological, meteorological, and biological types. As noted above, climate change
is not treated as a hazard in its own right but rather an “aggravating factor.” Types of Disasters:
Definition of Hazard, supra note 46. By contrast, the U.N. approach lists biological, environmental,
geological, hydrometeorological, and technological types of hazard without relating them to
particular origins. Environmental degradation is listed under “environmental hazards.” However,
this category is qualified by the assertion that many of the processes that fall into it “may be termed
drivers of hazard and risk rather than hazards in themselves, such as soil degradation, deforestation,
loss of biodiversity, salinization and sea-level rise.” U.N. Report, supra note 41, at 19. A more recent
U.N. document offers a still more diverse typology of hazards as geophysical, hydrological,
meteorological, climatological, extra-terrestrial, environment degradation, biological, and
technological. See U.N. OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR
MONITORING AND REPORTING ON PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING THE GLOBAL TARGETS OF THE
SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 172–73 (2017) .
In other words, it is necessary to decide how a focus on environmental factors maps onto the
different approaches to classifying hazards. For instance, on the U.N. approach, is it to be done by
origin, in which case does the term “environmental” cover only hazards of “natural” origin or also
those of “socionatural origin” (or even those of “anthropogenic” origin); or by type, in which case,
does the term cover all types (“biological,” “geological,” etc.) or only some (only “environmental,”
for instance, or “not technological”)?
The most recent U.N. approach includes geophysical, hydrological, meteorological, climatological,
extra-terrestrial, environment degradation, biological, and technological hazards. U.N. OFFICE FOR
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, supra note 47. However, with reference to the origins of the hazards,
the U.N. approach expressly excludes “armed conflicts and other situations of social instability or
tension.” U.N. Report supra note 41, at 18.

48
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some situations.50 Such criticisms foreground important questions about whether
disparate types of hazardous events might impact in different ways on mobility
decisions or on any resulting patterns of movement, pointing to a need for distinct
kinds of legal responses. 51
Meanwhile, on the “human mobility” side of the nexus, legal studies tend to
privilege movement with an international character.52 This mirrors wider public
concern, which engages mainly with the cross-border aspect of climate and
disaster mobility. Yet empirical evidence suggests that international movement is
a less significant form of mobility in this context, in terms of numbers and
vulnerability, than internal displacement or enforced immobility.53 Many legal
studies also seem to assume that movement caused by environmental factors will
be from Global South to North.54 Moreover, they regularly cite the predicament
of “sinking” Pacific islands as the archetypal empirical problem scenario for the
law and, among international environmental lawyers, resettlement of the climatedisplaced to the Global North is often advanced as a solution.55 Much of the legal
literature also seems to assume that the movement has an essentially “forced”
character,56 reflecting its framing of environmental change as a “push” factor.

50
51

52

53

54

55

56

MCADAM, supra note 40, at 247–49; MAYER, supra note 22, at 87–89.
For discussion of the empirical evidence in relation to the distinct climate-related hazards of (1)
storms, rains and floods, (2) droughts and desertification, and (3) sea level rise. See Piguet et al.,
supra note 12, at 6–12, 14–16. Indeed, the distinctions between the various forms of migration are
not always neat. See generally Graeme Hugo, Lessons from Past Forced Resettlement for Climate Change
Migration, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 260.
Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 15. However, some of the “solutions” proposed are extended also to
those internally displaced by climate change. See, e.g., David Hodgkinson, Tess Burton, Heather
Anderson & Lucy Young, ‘The Hour When the Ship Comes In’: A Convention for Persons Displaced by
Climate Change, 36 MONASH U.L. REV. 69 (2010); Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a
Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees, 10 GLOB. ENV’T POL. 60
(2010). Most legal studies, however, tend to treat internal displacement in this context as adequately
addressed by the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
On the former, see Khalid Koser, Climate Change and Internal Displacement: Challenges to the Normative
Framework, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 289. On the latter, those most
vulnerable to the effects of climate change often do not have the resources to move internationally
or at all. See Dug Cubie, In-Situ Adaptation: Non-Migration as a Coping Strategy for Vulnerable Persons, in
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 99 (Dimitra
Manou et al. eds., 2017).
Carol Farbotko, Representation and Misrepresentation of Climate Migrants, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 67, 70–77; Piguet, et al., supra note
12, at 15; Gemenne, supra note 23, at 231–35.
Katrina M. Wyman, Ethical Duties to Climate Migrants, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 347. It is evident too in the emphasis on legal
proposals for international “resettlement” of climate migrants that seem to presuppose the
unavailability of internal mobility options. See, e.g., Biermann & Boas, supra note 52. This may reflect
wider stereotypes about this issue. See Simonelli, supra note 8, at 23–53.
Gemenne, supra note 23, at 253; Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 15.
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Even where the potential for “voluntary” movement is acknowledged, the main
focus of legal studies remains on responding to the forced aspects of mobility in
this context.57 Similarly, it is well recognized that we should avoid characterizing
migration merely as a failure to adapt to environmental change, since movement
is not only a reactive last resort but can also be a proactive adaptive coping
strategy.58
Finally, returning briefly to the intersection between “mobility” and “the
environment,” it is important to acknowledge the recent surge of interest among
scholars in how the coronavirus pandemic will shape the movement of persons
globally.59 In tandem, many governments around the world have imposed
measures to strictly limit international movement into their territories, especially
by non-nationals travelling from any territory where the virus appears to have
been poorly contained.60 On the one hand, the situation in 2020 is a stark
illustration of the fact that the “environment-mobility” nexus can manifest itself
in diverse forms. On the other hand, it shows that their legal implications may
differ. In this regard, epidemics and pandemics, as specific kinds of biological
hazard, represent something of a special case. Given that human mobility within
and between states is often one of the main vectors by which the hazard is
transmitted to new communities, along with the attendant risk of disaster, they
raise particular sets of questions in the mobility context around the legal
framework for (exceptional) measures regulating or restricting entry and free
movement to minimize the transmission of infection.61 Since these legal issues are
57

See, e.g., Kälin, supra note 34, at 96.

58

Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 15–16; Richard Black et al., Migration as Adaptation, 478 NATURE 447,
449 (2011).

59

See, for example, the contributions to the Coronavirus and Mobility Forum hosted by the Centre
on Migration, Policy, and Society at the University of Oxford, available at The Coronavirus and Mobility
Forum, COMPAS, https://perma.cc/6QVV-VL6G.
In the U.S., for example, the President issued a proclamation in April 2020 suspending entry into
its territory for certain immigrants who may present risk to the U.S. labor market’s ability to recover
from economic downturns related to the COVID-19 outbreak. Proclamation No. 10,014, 85 Fed.
Reg. 23,441 (Apr. 22, 2020). Globally, it is reported that “nearly all” states have imposed entry
restrictions for persons travelling from territories where the virus has become widespread, with
some temporarily prohibiting the entry of all non-citizens and non-residents. Moreover, “nearly all”
states have introduced additional health screening procedures at ports of entry, with “most”
requiring travelers from affected territories to be quarantined for a period of time on entry. Most
countries also advise their nationals against non-essential international travel or to specific
jurisdictions where the outbreak is more severe. See Immigration Update: Coronavirus, FRAGOMEN
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/2S49-L6L4.

60

61

Among the many short legal analyses recently published on this topic, see, for example, Adina
Ponta, Human Rights Law in the Time of the Coronavirus, 24 ASIL INSIGHTS (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://perma.cc/HLT9-4TDW; Elspeth Guild, EU Fundamental Rights, Human Rights and Free
Movement in Times of Covid19, RLI BLOG (May 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/7DRQ-EQGV; Bríd
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important in and of themselves, and they are separate from those relating generally
to the entry and stay of people affected by other kinds of hazards, they deserve
study in their own right and will not be addressed further here.

B. Defining the Legal Problem
Legal debate on the environment-mobility nexus is underpinned by certain
assumptions about not only the nature of the underlying empirical situation but
also the framing of the legal problem. This debate assumes the essential legal
problem to be that the law does not adequately regulate the situation of persons
who leave their country due to environmental factors, especially climate change.
Implicit in that statement are empirical assumptions about which parts of the
environment-mobility nexus are important for legal regulation, as outlined above.
But the way that legal scholarship addresses this perceived gap in the law also
reflects certain legal assumptions about how that gap in the law is itself constituted
and, ultimately, resolved. Those assumptions serve both to channel the resulting
legal debate in particular directions and to eclipse other productive lines of inquiry.
By elucidating these underpinning premises, we can better understand where and
how a case study of the Americas might contribute to debate on legal responses
to the environment-mobility nexus.
Firstly, legal scholarship reflects an international law standpoint. Indeed, in
essence, this is a debate about international law. This focus on international law
in particular is hardly surprising, since both migration and the environment are
intuitively global phenomena. Naturally, it seems to follow that international
mobility due to environmental drivers, as a global problem, calls for an international
legal response. Yet this conception of the legal problem as inherently one of
international law shapes the resulting analyses. As the following discussion will
show, not only is the problem framed as a gap in international law, but also
solutions to this problem are both located within international law and built from
existing international law.62 Although international law at the global level is the
focus of most legal studies, growing numbers of legal scholars now argue that new
norms of international law are more likely to be developed at the regional or even
bilateral level, at least in the first instance.63 Cooperation of this kind at the regional

62
63

Ní Ghráinne, Covid-19, Border Closures, and International Law, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS PRAGUE (May 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/M35L-TJEW. For an example from
international institutions, see U.N. Comm. on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families and U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants,
Joint Guidance Note on the Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Human Rights of
Migrants (May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/RZ5F-PN2E.
See, e.g., sources cited notes 83–90.
Platform on Disaster Displacement, State-led, Regional Consultative Processes: Opportunities to Develop
Legal Frameworks on Disaster Displacement, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 126
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level is seen as attractive to states since most migration is intra-regional in nature
already, regions are likely to face similar kinds of environmental processes, and
regional forms of international cooperation are already the status quo in most
parts of the world.64
By contrast, law at the national level is seen as largely irrelevant by the legal
literature. Even scholars who assess the few national law provisions on
environmental displacement ultimately dismiss them as “ad hoc” and
“inadequate,”65 “unpredictable” in terms of application and status,66 and full of
“vague language.”67 Such national law is further characterized as “inconsistent”
and “varying from one country to another.”68 It is also said to lack “legal
certainty,” as it is “not rooted in existing legal duties” but relies on “discretion
rather than legal obligation.”69 Of course, many of these complaints about vague
language, inconsistency, and so on appear overstated since they could be leveled
equally at international law. Likewise, the notion that national law cannot create
legal rules and duties for the state concerned is simply incorrect. Moreover, it is
notable that most scholars simply cite the same few protection provisions of
national law from states in the Global North.70 As a result, national law from states

64

(Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018); Karoline Popp, Regional Policy Perspectives, in PEOPLE
ON THE MOVE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 230 (Etienne Piguet & Frank Laczko eds., 2014); Philippe
Boncour & Bruce Burson, Climate Change and Migration in the South Pacific Region: Policy Perspectives, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: SOUTH PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES 5, 22 (Bruce Burson ed., 2010);
Vikram Kolmannskog & Finn Myrstad, Environmental Displacement in European Asylum Law, 11 EUR.
J. MIGRATION & L. 313 (2009); Angela Williams, Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees
in International Law, 30 L. & POL’Y 502 (2008).
Popp, supra note 63, at 230; see also Black et al., supra note 58, at 449.

65

Christel Cournil, The Protection of “Environmental Refugees” in International Law, in MIGRATION AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 359, 369–70 (Étienne Piguet et al. eds., 2011); Thekli Anastasiou, Public
International Law’s Applicability to Migration as Adaptation, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL
IMPASSE? 172, 183–84 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018).

66

MCADAM, supra note 40, at 117.
Anastasiou, supra note 65, at 183–84.

67
68
69

70

MCADAM, supra note 40, at 117; Kälin, supra note 34, at 100.
Susan F. Martin, Towards an Extension of Complementary Protection?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 449, 449–50; Anastasiou, supra note
65, at 183–84.
This usually includes one or more of the following provisions: Temporary Protected Status in the
U.S. (8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (2020)); subsidiary protection provisions in Sweden (4 ch. 2.3 § Aliens Act
(Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2005:716)) and Finland (Aliens Act, Act No. 301/2004, Apr. 30,
2004, s. 109(1)); the European Union (E.U.) Temporary Protection Directive (Council Directive
2001/55, 2001 O.J. (L 212) (EC)) (as a tool for harmonizing national law); and, sometimes,
temporary suspensions of removals such as those applied in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake.
See, e.g., Mayer & Crépeau, supra note 10, at 12 n.11–12; Martin, supra note 69, at 461–64; Vikram
Kolmannskog & Lisetta Trebbi, Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Displacement: A Multi-Track
Approach to Filling the Protection Gaps, 92 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 713, 727–28 (2010)). A somewhat
wider range of provisions is cited by MCADAM, supra note 40, at 99–118.
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in the Global South is largely absent from the analysis.71 Furthermore, the focus
in these analyses on “international protection” provisions means that the wider
provisions of national immigration law are also largely overlooked.72 This is a
direct consequence of setting the legal debate so firmly within international law
parameters: in contrast to the law on international protection, immigration law is
not yet well established as a distinct body of international law.
Secondly, the perception of a gap in international law is the starting point
for most legal studies. It is clear that, in general, persons displaced across borders
by environmental factors do not benefit from international legal guarantees
relating to “refugees” (or those on “migrant workers”).73 Certainly, the extant
treaties dealing, respectively, with refugees, statelessness, human rights, or the
environment do not specifically address this situation.74 As will be discussed
below, many legal scholars seem to take this fact as sufficient evidence of a legal
gap in relation to the “protection” of such persons (and thus, by extension, of a
gap in relation to their envisaged need for “resettlement” to the Global North).
However, some scholars argue for a narrower gap that exists only in respect of
certain specific needs that are not covered by international human rights law,
which continues to benefit such persons.75 In particular, they argue that the general
gap in legal protection actually exists mainly in relation to the “legal status” of
these persons, to aspects of their “admission [and] continued stay [in the reception
country], and [to] protection against forcible return to their country of origin.”76

71

72

This may partly reflect the perception that the Global North will be the recipient of arrivals in this
context. As an exception, see the few counter examples from Africa and one from Argentina cited
in passing by MCADAM, supra note 40, at 105, 107.
For exceptions, see text at note 96 below. “International protection” refers to the assumption of an
obligation to provide protection to people who are outside their own country and face certain
specified kinds of persecution or harm in that country but lack the protection of their own state.

73

See, e.g., WALTER KÄLIN & NINA SCHREPFER, UNHCR LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH
SERIES, NO. 24: PROTECTING PEOPLE CROSSING BORDERS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
NORMATIVE GAPS AND POSSIBLE APPROACHES 4, 49–56 (2012); Christel Cournil, Les réfugiés
écologiques: Quelle(s) protection(s), quel(s) statut(s)?, 4 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1035 (2006).

74

See supra note 73; see also MCADAM, supra note 40, at 39–98. McAdam equally dismisses the muchdebated prospect of the international law on statelessness resolving the situation of “sinking” small
island states. See MCADAM, supra note 40, at 119–60.
See Kälin, supra note 34, at 87–89. See also Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, Climate Change, Human
Rights and Migration: A Legal Analysis of Challenges and Opportunities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 131, 131.

75

76

Platform on Disaster Displacement, supra note 63, at 145; Kälin, supra note 34, at 89. The recent
comments of the UNHRC in Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016,
¶¶ 9.11–.14 (2020) suggest that, in principle, the effects of climate change (and possibly other forms
of environmental degradation) in an applicant’s country of origin could generate a sufficient threat
to the right to life to prevent refoulement on human rights grounds, although that threat would have
to be highly imminent. It would also not require states to grant admission or stay.
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Among legal scholars, the gap in legal international standards also tends to
be perceived in terms of an absence of “international protection” for persons who
flee their countries due solely to the impact of environmental factors.77 This
analogy with the situation of refugees, and other beneficiaries of international
protection, is evident from the literature’s principal concern with persons
unwillingly outside their country, recalling the “‘exilic’ bias” of refugee law.78 Some
scholars even explicitly frame the legal problem in this context as an absence of
international protection for forced movements, with “voluntary migration” simply
left to the discretion of states in national law.79 Yet those scholars not only
underestimate the difficulty of distinguishing “forced” and “voluntary” movement
in this context80 but also misrepresent the logic of international protection, which
turns on prospective risk in the country of origin and a lack of national protection
rather than the supposedly forced quality of movement.81 Even so, they show that,
analogous to the situation of refugees, the legal gap in relation to mobility on
environmental grounds is conceived principally as one of “international
protection” under international law.
Thirdly, the legal debate is “not about the law as it exists (lex lata), but about
what the law ought to be (lex ferenda).”82 In other words, the problem is largely
accepted, and the debate is really about solutions. In most cases, legal scholars
turn to international law to close this legal gap. Two main methods are evident.
On the one hand, certain scholars, particularly those from the international
refugee and human rights law fields, argue in favor of more expansively
interpreting existing norms of international law. Many of them advocate for
interpreting international refugee definitions broadly to properly take account of
how “human” inputs also shape “natural” disasters in any particular society.83
77

See MCADAM, supra note 40, at 36.

78

See Gervase J.L. Coles, The Human Rights Approach to the Solution of the Refugee Problem: A Theoretical
and Practical Enquiry, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195, 209 (Alan E. Nash ed., 1988).
See KÄLIN & SCHREPFER, supra note 73, at 62; Kälin, supra note 34, at 89–90, 95–96.

79
80

81
82
83

This reflects the complex intermingling of environmental and human factors, including adaptation
strategies and coping mechanisms, especially in the face of slow-onset processes See supra note 25
and accompanying text.
See generally MCADAM, supra note 40, at 98; McGregor, supra note 25.
See Mayer & Crépeau, supra note 10, at 13.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text. This approach can be discerned in SCOTT, supra note 30;
SANJULA WEERASINGHE, UNHCR LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH SERIES, NO. 39:
IN HARM'S WAY: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF NEXUS DYNAMICS BETWEEN
CONFLICT OR VIOLENCE AND DISASTER OR CLIMATE CHANGE 109–10 (2018); Madeline Garlick,
Marine Franck & Erica Bower, Enhancing Legal Protection for People Displaced in the Context of Disasters
and Climate Change, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra note 18, at 118,
121; Selwyn Fraser, Climate Persecutors: Climate Change Displacement and the International Community as
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Some also propose the development of soft law instruments to provide temporary
or similar protection to the broader class of persons fleeing environmental
factors.84 Such proposals, often touted as merely a first step on the path to creating
a new treaty dedicated to this challenge, also often creatively draw on, and develop,
existing international law principles from the field of international protection
law.85
On the other hand, an alternative approach, more common among
international environmental law scholars, proposes new treaty law to fill the legal
gap. A few argue for amending the terms of existing treaties in the refugee field,86
although the idea is rightly dismissed by refugee law authorities as unworkable.87
Many others call for a new treaty, either standalone or under the framework of
international environmental law, for which they provide draft proposals.88 At their
Persecutor, 20 N.Z. J. ENV’T L. 107, 110 (2016); Christopher M. Kozoll, Poisoning the Well: Persecution,
the Environment, Refugee Status, 15 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L. & POL’Y 271, 297 (2004).
84

85

86

87

88

See Camilla Schloss, Cross-border Displacement Due to Environmental Disaster: A Proposal for UN Guiding
Principles to Fill the Legal Protection Gap, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra
note 18, at 243, 247–48; Elizabeth Ferris & Jonas Bergmann, Soft Law, Migration and Climate Change
Governance, 8 J. HUM. RIGHTS & ENV’T 6, 12 (2017); Tamara Wood, Developing Temporary Protection in
Africa, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 23, 23 (2015); MCADAM, supra note 40, at 256–66.
Several of these proposals focus on the provision of “temporary protection” for people who flee
disasters or climate change but do not qualify as refugees. See, e.g., Garlick et al., supra note 83, at
121–22; Volker Türk, Temporary Protection Arrangements to Fill a Gap in the Protection Regime, 49 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 40, 40–41(2015); Wood, supra note 84, at 23–25; MCADAM, supra note 40, at 256–
66.
See, e.g., Beatriz Felipe Pérez, Beyond the Shortcomings of International Law: A Proposal for the Legal Protection
of Climate Migrants, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra note 18, at 214,
223–24.
See, e.g., MCADAM, supra note 40, at 197–200; Bruce Burson, Protecting the Rights of People Displaced by
Climate Change: Global Issues and Regional Perspectives, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: SOUTH
PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 159, 160–61; UNHCR, CLIMATE CHANGE, NATURAL
DISASTERS AND HUMAN DISPLACEMENTS: A UNHCR PERSPECTIVE 9 (2009),
https://perma.cc/6LFH-CR2Q.
See, e.g., The INTERNATIONAL CENTRE OF COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Draft Convention on
the Status of Environmentally Displaced Persons, (4th ed. 2018), https://perma.cc/6JLH-QCMN; see also
Prieur, supra note 40, at 238–41 (providing further commentary); Biermann & Boas, supra note 52,
at 76 (proposing the Protocol on Recognition, Protection and Resettlement of Climate Migrants);
Hodgkinson et al., supra note 52 (proposing the Convention for Persons Displaced by Climate
Change); Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on
Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 349, 372 (2009) (proposing the international
convention on climate refugees); Kara Moberg, Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally
Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary Protection, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1135–36 (2008) (proposing the
global environmentally-based immigration visa program); Williams, supra note 63, at 519–23
(proposing regional agreements for climate refugees); Dana Zartner, Stemming the Flow of
Environmental Displacement: Creating a Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment, 13 COLO.
J. INT’L ENV’T L. & POL’Y 1, 21–22 (2001) (proposing the Convention on the Protection of
Environmentally Displaced Persons); Gregory S. McCue, Note, Environmental Refugees: Applying
International Environmental Law to Involuntary Migration, 6 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 151, 177 (1994)
(proposing the international convention on refugees).

Winter 2021

281

Chicago Journal of International Law

core, though, these proposals seek to promote status-based forms of international
protection for their respective classes of refugee-like beneficiaries,89 whether they
are defined in the draft instruments as, variously, “environmentally displaced
persons,” “climate migrants,” “persons displaced by climate change,” or “climate
refugees.” Likewise, many of the new obligations that these proposals envisage in
areas such as resettlement and distribution serve to reproduce or develop existing
legal principles drawn from the law of international protection or from
international environmental law.90 None of the proposals have yet been taken up
by states.91
Finally, as no clear ethical basis exists for privileging environmental factors
over drivers of migration such as poverty, there is debate over whether such
special protection can be justified.92 Rather than arbitrarily creating new regimes
for a privileged few, some suggest that we should instead focus on fully promoting
the basic human rights of all migrants without distinction.93 Similarly, recognition
of the way that environmental and human factors intertwine to shape vulnerability
and mobility leads some to argue that a focus on protecting the displaced misses
the bigger picture “that such migration is a consequence of the human insecurity
imposed on the South in the current global order.”94 These approaches suggest
that mobility in this context cannot be addressed in isolation from the pressing
need to respond to wider migration, environmental, and development challenges
and their impact on countries that are particularly exposed to the risk of disaster.95
For instance, certain scholars working in the Pacific have begun to analyze climate
mobility in the context of wider migration patterns and processes.96 As a result,
89

See Christel Cournil, The Protection of “Environmental Refugees” in International Law, in MIGRATION AND
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 359, 361–63 (listing scholarly proposals identified as sharing a
concept of “protection” as their common basis).

90

On the latter point, see, for example, AVIDAN KENT & SIMON BEHRMAN, FACILITATING THE
RESETTLEMENT AND RIGHTS OF CLIMATE REFUGEES: AN ARGUMENT FOR DEVELOPING EXISTING
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 122–59 (2018).
The currently limited extent of formal state interest in creating a new treaty can be evidenced from
the few examples cited in Prieur, supra note 40, at 237. See also MCADAM, supra note 40, at 187–201.
See MAYER, supra note 22, at 31–35; Peter Penz, International Ethical Responsibilities to “Climate Change
Refugees”, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note
34, at 151, 152–54.

91
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93
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See MAYER, supra note 22, at 159–85.
Stephen Castles, Concluding Remarks on the Climate Change-Migration Nexus, in MIGRATION
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 415, 425.
Id. at 424–26; see also MAYER, supra note 22, at 16–35.

AND

See, e.g., BRUCE BURSON & RICHARD BEDFORD, NANSEN INITIATIVE, CLUSTERS AND HUBS:
TOWARD A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR VOLUNTARY ADAPTIVE MIGRATION IN THE PACIFIC
(2013), https://perma.cc/6TL8-AZ3Q; Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Migration as Adaptation:
Opportunities and Limits, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
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they now argue that climate migration might be addressed “within existing
international migration mechanisms,”97 and ask how immigration law in Australia
and New Zealand could be tweaked, or how bilateral or regional arrangements
may be developed, to accommodate future mobility linked to climate change.98

C. Framing the Case Study of the Americas
Legal debate on the environment-mobility nexus revolves principally around
the question of how to respond to international mobility shaped by environmental
factors. As such, this Article aims to contribute to that core legal debate rather
than to consider the legal implications of other aspects of this nexus, such as
internal mobility linked to environmental factors.99 Nonetheless, this Article draws
on insights from the preceding literature review as points of entry into the legal
debate. Firstly, on the “mobility” side of the nexus, it focuses on travel, entry, and
stay for non-nationals, or “aliens,” as the key challenge. Secondly, on the
“environment” side of the nexus, it focuses broadly on disasters and the
underlying hazards rather than limiting the analysis to climate change alone.
Thirdly, on causality, it addresses not only how such environmental factors
contribute to displacement but also how they might impact international mobility
in other ways. These insights provide a strong foundation for renewed
consideration of key areas of the legal debate, such as the scope of existing legal
protection, the nature of potential legal development in this field, and how to
accommodate the multicausal nature of migration.
This Article interrogates these questions through a case study of the
Americas. On the one hand, this approach reflects the contention that abstract
analysis of international law at the global level has largely reached the limits of
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 34, at 37, 39–41; Catherine Locke, W. Neil Adger & P. Mick Kelly,
Changing Places: Migration’s Social and Environmental Consequences, 42 ENV’T 24, 26–29 (2000); BLACK,
supra note 20, at 23–52; Hugo, supra note 27, at 119–120.
97

BURSON & BEDFORD, supra note 96, at 10; MCADAM, supra note 40, at 201–11; Graeme Hugo,
Climate Change-Induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia and the Pacific, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 34, at 9, 33; see also
Jon Barnett & Natasha Chamberlain, Migration as Climate Change Adaptation: Implications for the Pacific,
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: SOUTH PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 51, 56;
Richard Bedford & Charlotte Bedford, International Migration and Climate Change: A Post-Copenhagen
Perspective on Options for Kiribati and Tuvalu, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: SOUTH PACIFIC
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 89, 125.

98

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
The existing human rights-based framework codified in the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement is usually seen as sufficient to address the situation of people forcibly displaced by
climate change within their own country. See Kälin, supra note 34, at 93–94. However, elaboration
of the norms may be needed in relation to durable solutions and accountability for climate change
drivers. See Elizabeth Ferris, The Relevance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement for the Climate
Change-Migration Nexus, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE
LAW, supra note 5, at 108, 119.
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what it can contribute to advancing these kinds of legal debates. On the other
hand, it takes seriously the observation by some scholars that international
mobility linked to environmental factors—as well as the development of legal
responses and cooperation by states—is most likely to play out within particular
regions rather than at the global level, at least initially. As a case study, the
Americas offer a contrasting example to the oft-cited Pacific case.100 Certainly, like
those in the Pacific, countries in the Americas are exposed regularly to sundry
hazards. Yet, in other ways, the Americas are more diverse, comprising two
continents with extensive land borders, in contrast to the small island states that
make up most of the Pacific. Moreover, the Americas are twenty times more
populous than the Pacific and contain not only some of the world’s largest and
richest countries but also some of its poorest, as well as many others located in
between these two extremes.101

III. E MPIRICAL D YNAMICS IN THE A MERICAS
The gaps in protection identified by legal scholars writing on the
environment-mobility nexus exist only in relation to the presumed reality of
international movement caused by environmental threats in the country of origin.
In other words, the legal problem corresponds to an assumed underlying empirical
phenomenon. Yet many legal scholars seem merely to rely on vague and poorlyevidenced, even rather speculative, assertions about this phenomenon’s existence,
scope, and characteristics, often citing disjointed and rather particular examples as
if they demonstrated some general trend.102 However, if we want to truly assess
the adequacy of the law in relation to specific empirical phenomena, such as the
international movement of persons in the context of environmental push factors,
then we need to engage more robustly with the growing body of natural and social
science research on this topic.103 Toward this end, the present Article seeks to
derive a more precise understanding of the environment-mobility nexus in the
region of the Americas from the somewhat fragmentary research that exists thus
far. From this point of entry, this Article elucidates a few of the main ways in
which disasters and hazards appear, firstly, to act as a push factor for diverse
dynamics of international movement in the Americas and, secondly, to shape the

100
101

102

103

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
International Database: Population by Continent 1980 to 2050, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010),
https://perma.cc/94KE-UUR4.
See, for example, the empirical “scene-setting” in Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent, Overcoming the
Legal Impasse? Setting the Scene, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra note 18,
at 3–6.
Calls for more robust engagement with the empirical evidence are made by some legal scholars. See,
e.g., Mayer, supra note 18, at 90–91.
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experience of international mobility in other ways that are important for the law
to consider.

A. International Movement Lin ked to Environmental Threats
in the Americas
Empirical research confirms that the diverse environmental threats to which
countries in the Americas are exposed can act as a push factor for movement.
Evidence of this impact exists for both sudden-onset events, such as storms,
hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes, and slow-onset events, such as drought,
erosion, desertification, and glacier retreat that may be linked to climate change.104
Social scientists have suggested that these different kinds of hazards produce
distinct patterns of mobility in terms of duration, distance, and character, although
the evidence remains somewhat mixed.105 Even so, the data is clear that suddenand slow-onset disasters now push millions of incidents of internal movement by
individuals in the countries of the Americas each year.106 By contrast, data on
international movement due to disasters are more fragmentary and not routinely
collected. Yet, as the following discussion shows, international movement linked
to both slow- and sudden-onset events in this region is a present reality and not
just an abstract legal concern, even if its scale seems less significant than that of
internal movement.107 Of course, given that the latter is predicted to increase with
time,108 so may the former. These trends in the Americas accord with those in
other regions of the world,109 suggesting that this region is not an anomaly in that
respect.
104

105

See generally Raoul Kaenzig & Etienne Piguet, Migration and Climate Change in Latin America and the
Caribbean, in PEOPLE ON THE MOVE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE supra note 63, at 155. There are also
areas of Suriname, Guyana, and the Bahamas where the impact of sea-level rises on economic
livelihoods could force migration in the future. Id. at 169.
Id. at 155; Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 6–12, 15–16.

106

Calculations by the author based on figures in INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE
(IDMC), ANNUAL REPORTS 2019 (2019), https://perma.cc/AZ7S-3W7B, suggest that, between
2008 and 2018, over 28.5 million reported instances of internal movement due to sudden-onset
disasters linked to natural hazards occurred in the Americas region. Across the same time period,
the figures for internal displacements by sub-region are: Central America (798,472); Caribbean
(6,705,000); North America (9,851,300); South America (11,184,180).

107

For instance, for the U.S. as a key destination country, approximate calculations by the author of
instances of immigration linked to disasters from other countries in the Americas, including those
granted entry or stay under normal immigration categories—drawing on Onelica C. Andrade
Afonso, Natural Disasters and Migration: Storms in Central America and the Caribbean and Immigration to
the U.S., 14 EXPL. 1, 10 (2011)—and under temporary protected status in disaster contexts, suggest
an average annual upper ceiling in the tens of thousands.

108

See WORLD BANK GROUP [WBO], GROUNDSWELL: PREPARING FOR INTERNAL CLIMATE
MIGRATION; POLICY NOTE #3: INTERNAL CLIMATE MIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 1 (2018),
https://perma.cc/9Y5L-ASPE.
See Kaenzig & Piguet, supra note 104, at 171; Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 6–12, 15–16.
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As in other regions, such mobility is shaped by multiple, intersecting drivers,
with environmental pressures often just one more push factor in contexts
sometimes riven by deep inequality.110 Even so, empirical evidence from the
Americas suggests that at least three different strands of international movement
pushed by environmental factors can be discerned. The most visible form of
movement takes place shortly before or after a sudden-onset hazardous event is
perceived as approaching, as people living near land borders may temporarily
cross into the neighboring country to escape the impact of the event or to access
better shelter or aid on the other side of the border. The movement usually follows
existing, well-established patterns of daily back-and-forth migratory crossings in
border regions. Examples include north Guatemalans crossing the border into
Mexico to better weather tropical storms, victims of flooding seeking respite by
crossing from south Colombia to Ecuador or from Amazonian Bolivia and Peru
to Brazil, and Chileans affected by earthquakes or mudslides in frontier zones that
are cut off from other parts of Chile seeking aid in accessible Argentinian towns.111
Crucially, most people move temporarily to escape not only actual disasters but
also perceived oncoming disasters or hazardous events.
Another strand of international movement in the Americas consists of those
persons who leave their countries in the context of slow-onset disasters. The data
shows that these persons, who are often from populations or social sectors whose
livelihood depends on particular forms of agriculture, also tend to follow existing
migration routes out of the country. For example, severe droughts linked to
climatic factors are shown to increase migration from affected parts of rural
Mexico to the U.S.112 Similarly, slow-onset events linked to changing weather and
rainfall patterns, soil erosion, and other environmental degradation appear to have
helped push migration from rural parts of the Dominican Republic and Haiti,

110
111

112

See Kaenzig & Piguet, supra note 104, at 171.
See CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 17; CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 12.
See Isabelle Chort & Maëlys de la Rupelle, Determinants of Mexico-US Outward and Return Migration
Flows: A State-Level Panel Data Analysis, 53 DEMOGRAPHY 1453, 1474 (2016); Raphael J. Nawrotzki,
Fernando Riosmena & Lori M. Hunter, Do Rainfall Deficits Predict U.S.-Bound Migration from Rural
Mexico? Evidence from the Mexican Census, 32 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 129, 144–47 (2013);
THE NATIONAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND MIGRATION: THE
U.S.-MEXICO CASE STUDY 25 (1997). One study suggests that climate-related international
migration from rural Mexico is predominantly undocumented. See Raphael J Nawrotzki, Fernando
Riosmena, Lori M. Hunter & Daniel M. Runfola, Undocumented Migration in response to Climate Change,
1 INT’L J. POPULATION STUD. 60, 67 (2015). Some suggest that temporary migration of up to two
years is the predominant form of international migration by those affected by drought and
desertification, rather than permanent migration. See Michelle Leighton, Drought, Desertification and
Migration: Past Experiences, Predicted Impacts and Human Rights Issues, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE
CHANGE supra note 12, at 331, 349.
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sometimes to other countries.113 Given that the impact of such slow-onset
disasters is often mediated via social factors to a greater extent than for suddenonset events, their role in driving mobility can be highly contextual.114 However,
it is not always possible to differentiate the respective contribution of slow- and
sudden-onset events to pushing movement, especially in locations where they
overlap. For instance, research in some rural areas of Honduras and Haiti shows
how migration out of the country from those areas is driven by spiraling livelihood
pressures resulting from the combined impact of slow-onset environmental
degradation with sudden-onset tropical storms.115
Similar questions about how to frame the impact of disasters and hazards as
a push factor for mobility emerge in evidence of a third form of international
movement in the Americas that takes place up to a year or more after a suddenonset disaster has occurred. This “delayed” movement seems to be driven not so
much by the hazard’s sudden and immediate disaster impact as by its enduring
implications for the viability of long-term household livelihood plans.116 It is
documented mainly in poorer and less-resilient Central American and Caribbean
countries where a tropical storm or earthquake has had a particularly devastating
effect on society and infrastructure at the national level.117 That data dovetails with
other research showing that regular migration to the U.S. increases after severe
storms in these countries, and also in Mexico, albeit only after a lag period of up
to a year.118 Like the other two strands of movement, this one also tends to follow

113

See Stefan Alscher, Environmental Degradation and Migration on Hispaniola Island, 49 INT’L MIGRATION
164, 169 (2011); Lykke Andersen, Lotte Lund & Dorte Verner, Migration and Climate Change, in
REDUCING POVERTY, PROTECTING LIVELIHOODS, AND BUILDING ASSETS IN A CHANGING
CLIMATE: SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
195, 202 (Dorte Verner ed., 2010).

114

See Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 8–12.
See Alscher, supra note 113, at 170–73; David J. Wrathall, Migration Amidst Social-Ecological Regime
Shift: The Search for Stability in Garífuna Villages of Northern Honduras, 40 HUM. ECOLOGY 583, 594
(2012).
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This lag may reflect both the diminishing access to humanitarian aid in the disaster-affected country
as the months pass and the time needed for households to collect the resources for travel. See
CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 12–13. Alternatively, if people are able to
rebuild homes and replant crops during the initial recovery, households or household members may
then migrate to seek alternative income sources. See McLeman, supra note 29, at 43–44.
See McLeman, supra note 29, at 43–44; Raphael J. Nawrotzki & Jack DeWaar, Climate Shocks and the
Timing of Migration from Mexico, 38 POPULATION & ENV’T 72, 86–87 (2016); Afonso, supra note 107,
at 9; Marlene Attzs, Natural Disasters and Remittances: Exploring the Linkages Between Poverty, Gender, and
Disaster Vulnerability in Caribbean SIDS, 61 UNU-WIDER RES. PAPER 1, 9 (2008).
See Parag Mahajan & Dean Yang, Taken by Storm: Hurricanes, Migrant Networks, and U.S. Immigration,
17, 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23756, 2017), https://perma.cc/PE5ADJDE; Afonso, supra note 107, at 9.
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traditional migration routes from the affected country.119 However, where the
routes are blocked, then it seems that new ones are forged, as with the new
patterns of Haitian mobility that reoriented toward South American countries
when some traditional Haitian migration destination countries such as the U.S.
tried to close their borders after the 2010 earthquake.120
This growing evidence base shows that environmental phenomena in the
Americas do contribute to pushing diverse forms of international movement.
Indeed, the three strands of movement identified here likely provide only a few
pertinent examples of how the wider mobility dynamics play out.121 Certainly, it
seems that only in rare cases will these forms of movement be likely to satisfy the
long-established legal bases for international protection by states.122 Equally,
though, they do suggest that, while framing the empirical problem in terms of
“disasters” offers a useful point of entry for understanding how environmental
factors influence human mobility, a limitation of the “disaster” concept is that it
describes only one way in which hazards can act as drivers of mobility. In this
regard, the examples imply that people do not leave only due to the occurrence or
risk of disasters at the societal level.123 Rather, some movement also occurs
preemptively due to the perceived potential impact of a hazard at the individual
or household level, regardless of whether its collective impact at the societal level
will result in a “disaster.” Likewise, other patterns of movement occur after the
“disaster” phase has passed due to the hazard’s perceived longer-term or ongoing
impact on the viability of individual or household livelihood strategies. In other
words, while a hazardous event is a prerequisite for a “disaster,” the perceived or
actual impact of a hazard or hazardous event at the household level can be
sufficient to drive movement by the affected people, even in the absence of
disaster conditions at the societal level.
These three strands of movement also suggest that any analytical distinction
between sudden- and slow-onset disasters may prove less relevant for our
purposes than the recognition that hazardous events and disasters can have both

119

Social scientists have observed that international movements in this context tend to occur most
frequently where pre-existing relationships of migration exist between the sending and receiving
countries. See, e.g., Kaenzig & Piguet, supra note 104, at 171.
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PATRICIA WEISS FAGEN, NANSEN INITIATIVE, RECEIVING HAITIAN MIGRANTS IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE 2010 EARTHQUAKE 27, (2013), https://perma.cc/7BBF-BYWA; Nikola Gütermann & Eve
Schneider, The Earthquake in Haiti, in THE STATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 39, 44 (François
Gemenne et al. eds., 2011).

121

For instance, other scenarios might include movement away from communities that are exposed to
the repeated impact of sudden-onset events.

122

See MCADAM, supra note 40, at 52–98. See Section IV below for discussion of why the legal criteria
for international protection are likely to be engaged only rarely by these circumstances.

123

On the U.N. approach, even the concept of “disaster risk” is defined in terms of potential impact
at the collective level on “a system, society or a community.” See U.N. Report, supra note 41, at 14.
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short-term and long-term impacts on mobility at the household level, even if their
relative proximity as push factors for mobility may diminish over the long-term.
In general, then, these conclusions point to a need for researchers to engage with
the broader ways in which hazards impact human mobility, and to recognize that
the occurrence of a “disaster” is but one way in which those hazards can shape
movement. But what does this mean for the law? Certainly, the “disaster” concept
was not designed to be applied as a legal basis for regulating movement. At the
same time, it has definite advantages over concepts such as “climate change” or
“the environment” that suggest its application to this legal context merits
consideration. As a potential basis for regulating entry and stay by non-nationals,
though, the empirical evidence suggests that lawmakers will need to reflect
carefully on whether to use the concept of “disasters” strictly as a threshold that
requires that a hazard has an impact at the collective level in the affected country
or, instead, to advance a more granular approach to the wider ways in which
“hazardous events” or the underlying “hazards” impact mobility options at the
individual or household level.

B. Other Forms of Environmental Impact on International
Mobility
The legal literature is principally concerned with environmental factors as a
driver of international mobility or “push factor.” It is recognized that this causality
can play out in diverse scenarios—for instance, as a result of sudden-onset
disasters, slow-onset disasters, the impact of climate on conflict over natural
resources, etc.—but the emphasis remains on how such phenomena act as drivers
of movement by affected persons.124 More recently, though, some legal scholars
have argued in favor of a broader conception of this causal nexus by pointing to
the possibility that environmental factors might also shape mobility by acting as a
“pull factor” due to the new opportunities created by climate change or by
mitigation or adaptation activities.125 Building on those analyses, the present
Article contends that engagement with the empirical evidence from the Americas
discloses still other ways in which disasters may shape the phenomenon of
international mobility. Moreover, these further configurations of the
environment-mobility nexus pose particularly acute questions for the law,
especially in relation to travel, entry, and stay for affected persons.
Certainly, the evidence from the Americas confirms that not all international
mobility in the context of environmental threats will take the form of a
spontaneous movement by affected persons. In the Pacific region, scholars have
long debated the prospect of inhabitants of “sinking” small island states being
124
125

See, e.g., Kälin, supra note 34, at 84–92.
See MAYER, supra note 22, at 22–25.
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relocated to other countries and the legal implications of such measures. 126
However, data from the Americas verifies that organized transfers of disasteraffected persons by states already take place in the form of evacuations carried out
before or shortly after a sudden-onset disaster.127 Such evacuations are often
undertaken by a foreign state for its nationals unfortunate enough to be caught up
in a serious disaster overseas. In the Americas, however, empirical data shows that
nationals of the disaster-affected country have sometimes also been evacuated to
other countries by those states. Examples include the evacuation to other
Caribbean islands as well as to the U.K. and U.S. of most of the population of
Montserrat when the volcano erupted in 1995 and certain profiles of Haitian
nationals evacuated on medical or similar grounds by Canada, Mexico, and the
U.S. after the 2010 Haiti earthquake.128 This raises the question of how the law
treats such organized transfers in terms of travel, entry, and stay.
Crucially, studies of the Americas region show that disasters can impact a
range of other legal aspects of international mobility for aliens.129 Thus, where a
disaster occurs in the country of origin, it may limit possibilities for return,
whether voluntary or enforced, with particular legal implications in terms of
removal and stay for nationals of that country. It may also reduce the flow of
resources from family or businesses in the home country that are needed for the
alien to support maintenance during studies or other lawful forms of stay in the
host country. Likewise, where a disaster occurs in the host country, it may impede
the alien’s basis for stay as a result of the death of the family member on whom
legal status depends, the destruction of the business that provides the basis for a
work permit, or an inability to comply with immigration reporting restrictions due
to damage to transport and communication infrastructures in the host country.
The disaster may also reduce or interrupt the capacity of immigration authorities
in the host country to process applications from aliens for travel, entry, and stay.
Overall, these scenarios suggest that the law needs to take a broader conception
of the environment-mobility nexus if it is to adequately regulate international
mobility in the context of environmental threats.

126

127
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See generally, e.g., Bruce Burson, Walter Kälin, Jane McAdam & Sanjula Weerasinghe, The Duty to Move
People Out of Harm’s Way in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters, 37 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 379
(2018); Jane McAdam & Elizabeth Ferris, Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change: Unpacking
the Legal and Conceptual Issues, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L COMPAR. L. 137 (2015).
Evacuations can also involve internal movement, as with the 2017 precautionary wholesale
mandatory evacuation by Antigua and Barbuda of the island of Barbuda and by the Bahamas of its
southern islands. See Kate Lyons, The Night Barbuda Died: How Hurricane Irma Created a Caribbean
Ghost Town, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/A4RN-SPNF; Bahamas to Evacuate
Islands in Path of “Irma”, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/PSH7-ZCTZ.
CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 13.
See id. at 13–14 for these examples.
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IV. I NTERNATIONAL P ROTECTION L AW IN THE A MERICAS
International law scholarship treats international mobility in the context of
environmental pressures as a new challenge that the existing law does not yet
adequately address. Moreover, most contributors to this debate frame that legal
gap, and its solution, principally in terms of international protection for affected
persons. At first glance, recent practice in the Americas appears to confirm this
point. Certainly, states rarely extend international protection to persons fleeing
environmental threats, despite claims by scholars as to the relevance of certain
regional legal instruments. Yet a detailed analysis of legal practice in this region
offers a more nuanced understanding. Crucially, this Section will show that certain
states have actually long recognized the challenge of international mobility caused
by disasters and, initially at least, some dealt with it as a matter of refugee
protection. Further, although this international protection approach waned as
states in the Americas increasingly became integrated into the global refugee law
regime, the underlying legal challenge was not discounted. Rather, a distinct new
legal approach toward the entry and stay of persons affected by a disaster can be
discerned in some of the national laws on refugees and international protection
adopted by states in the Americas.

A. Disasters and International Protection
At present, most states in the Americas are parties to the main binding U.N.
treaties on refugee protection and have incorporated pertinent aspects of the
“universal” refugee definition into national law.130 In Latin America, fifteen states
have also incorporated the regional expanded refugee definition endorsed by the
non-binding Cartagena Declaration into their national law.131 In a small number
130

These U.N. treaties define a “refugee” positively as any person who “owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” See Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees art. 1A(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(2)), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered
into force Oct. 4, 1967). The Caribbean is the exception in this region: only eight of thirteen states
are parties to the Protocol and only four have incorporated the refugee definition into national law
and policy. See CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 64.
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The Cartagena Declaration defines “refugees” also as “persons who have fled their country because
their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression,
internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously
disturbed public order.” Cartagena Declaration on Refugees § 3,(3), Nov. 1984, reprinted in 3
UNHCR, COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER LEGAL TEXTS
CONCERNING REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS: REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1196, 1197 (2007).
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay incorporate the expanded definition in national legislation.
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of states, national law also provides for complementary forms of international
protection based on non-refoulement standards in international human rights
treaties.132 None of these international instruments specifically mention the
occurrence or risk of a “disaster” in the country of origin as a basis for
international protection. Yet some legal scholars argue that these universal and
regional treaty norms could be interpreted to provide international protection to
persons fleeing disasters.133 Some limited practice exists in support of this
proposal. For example, after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, several Latin American
states did recognize a small number of Haitians as refugees due to the violence
unleashed by the disaster.134 Similarly, the French territories of the Antilles and
Guiana granted “subsidiary” forms of complementary international protection to
some Haitian asylum seekers in light of the security and other risks generated by
the earthquake.135
Crucially, though, in each case where states in the Americas did grant
international protection, whether under refugee law or complementary forms of
international protection, this was conferred due to the breakdown in the
institutions of national protection in Haiti and associated risks of violence
generated by the disaster. The fact that such violence and the lack of national
protection resulted from a disaster, as opposed to some other cause, was thus
treated as legally irrelevant for the purposes of determining international
Costa Rica applies it in national law by order of the courts. See U.N.H.C.R. REGIONAL LEGAL UNIT
OF THE BUREAU OF THE AMERICAS, TABLE 1: REGIONAL DEFINITION OF REFUGEE,
https://perma.cc/L7DS-LUS3.
132

Non-refoulement standards forbid the sending of a person to another country where they may face
specific kinds of persecution or other serious harms. Alongside the well-established rules on the
non-refoulement of refugees in refugee law, international human rights law prohibitions on sending a
person to a territory where the risk of torture exists form the main source of “complementary”
protection (in other words complementary to refugee protection) against refoulement for persons who
may not qualify as refugees stricto sensu under refugee law. In the Americas, national law in countries
such as Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, and the U.S. mostly reflects the
non-refoulement standards expressed by the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, (entered into force
June 26, 1987). See CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 41, 52–53.
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See, e.g., KÄLIN & SCHREPFER, supra note 73, at 34 (arguing that the Cartagena Declaration definition
may accommodate disaster-affected persons under the element relating to “other circumstances
which have seriously disturbed public order”).
Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, and Peru recognized some Haitians as refugees under the definitions
provided by one or other of these international instruments for refugee protection, based on the
rise of insecurity in Haiti resulting from the 2010 earthquake. See CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 17–18.
See Cedric Audebert, The Recent Geodynamics of Haitian Migration in the Americas: Refugees or Economic
Migrants?, 34 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ESTUDOS DE POPULAÇÃO 55, 61 (2017). The “subsidiary
protection” provided under E.U. law is based ultimately on the non-refoulement protection provided
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
3, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), to which France is also a party.

134

135

292

Vol. 21 No. 2

Environment, Mobility, and International Law

Cantor

protection. In fact, as a matter of national law, almost no state in the Americas
treats a disaster as, in itself, a basis for international protection under “universal”
or “regional” refugee definitions at the international level.136 Indeed, in some
states, national law expressly rules out such an interpretation.137 In practice, certain
states have even gone so far as to channel asylum claims by nationals of a disasteraffected country out of the international protection procedures so they can be
resolved instead under other legal provisions unrelated to international
protection.138 Thus, states in this region tend not to view persons fleeing a disaster
as requiring international protection, except in certain specific cases where its
impact includes clear risks of persecution or violence that fit with existing
concepts of international protection. The fact of the disaster itself, though, is
treated as legally irrelevant to determining international protection.
On its face, the current approach might seem to confirm the presumption
that law in the Americas has yet to come to terms with the challenge of
international mobility linked to environmental threats. However, a retrospective
analysis of legal practice in this region shows that states have not always taken this
approach to the application of international protection law. Indeed, between 1952
and 1980, national law in the U.S. expressly provided for different categories of
“persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity” to be resettled to the U.S. as
“refugees.”139 Moreover, during this early period, the U.S. was not alone in viewing
the challenge of persons displaced by disasters as a matter of refugee protection.
For instance, in 1978, Cuba adopted a definition of refugees including, inter alia,
persons who leave their country “due to cataclysm or other phenomena of
nature.”140 In 1979, the government of Trinidad and Tobago also contemplated
the challenge of “refugees from natural disasters” and decided that such cases “be
decided, when the need arises, on the basis of the circumstances prevailing in
Trinidad and Tobago at the particular period in time.”141
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137

138

139

140
141

Cuba is the exception to this consensus. See Decreto No. 26, art. 80, July 19, 1978 (Cuba),
https://perma.cc/F9MW-25VR [hereinafter Cuba Decree].
For example, Mexico expressly interprets the “other circumstances which have seriously disturbed
public order” element of the Cartagena Declaration refugee definition as applicable only to “acts
attributable to man.” See Reglamento de la Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria
[Regulations of the Law on Refugees and Complementary Protections] [RLRPC], art. 4(XI), Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 21-02-2012 (Mex.), https://perma.cc/5ZDY-A6TF (author
translation).
See, for example, Weerasinghe, supra note 83, at 64–75 for a discussion of the Brazilian procedural
response to Haitian asylum seekers after the earthquake.
See Royce Bernstein Murray & Sarah Petrin Williamson, Migration as a Tool for Disaster Recovery: A
Case Study on U.S. Policy Options for Post-Earthquake Haiti 27–30 (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Working Paper
255, 2011), https://perma.cc/66TG-DKUW.
See Cuba Decree, supra note 136 (author translation).
Cabinet Decision, Minute No. 4809, Nov. 16, 1979 (Trin. and Tobago).
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These examples show that, contrary to the assumption by some legal
scholars that international mobility linked to environmental threats represents a
new legal gap, this challenge has long been recognized in the practice of certain
states in the Americas. Indeed, the initial approach of those states to legally
resolving the challenge by adopting unilateral and sui generis refugee definitions in
national law waned only during the 1980s, as states across the Americas
increasingly joined the U.N. refugee treaties and incorporated their “universal”
refugee definition in national law. As a result, in this region today, the earlier
approach persists solely in Cuba, which remains outside the U.N. refugee treaty
regime. The role played by international law in this shift in approach is
noteworthy. In this instance, whereas the legal scholarship usually envisages a
positive role for international law in extending international protection to persons
fleeing disaster contexts, here it appears to have curtailed the protection available
to such persons under existing national law and thus helped create a “gap” as a
result of promoting the harmonization of national law with U.N. refugee treaty
law. Although this observation cannot be generalized beyond these specific
examples, it calls us to think more critically about the relationship between
national and international law in responding to this challenge.

B. An Alternative Legal Approach
From the 1990s, an alternative legal approach to the challenge of
international mobility linked to environmental threats can be discerned in the
broader “international protection” practice of certain states in the Americas. The
creation of “temporary protected status” (TPS) in the national law of the U.S.
offers one prominent example. Indeed, legal scholarship routinely cites the
“environmental disaster” limb of TPS as one of a small number of protection
provisions at the level of national law.142 This provision allows the U.S. authorities
to designate a foreign state (or part of it) for TPS relief if:
(i) there has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other
environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary,
disruption of living conditions in the area affected,
(ii) the foreign state is unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return
to the state of aliens who are nationals of the state, and
(iii) the foreign state officially has requested designation under this
subparagraph.143

142

See note 70 and accompanying text.

143

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 244A(b), 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254a).
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At the individual level, access to TPS is usually limited to nationals of the
designated country who are already present in the U.S.144 It thus serves principally
to temporarily regularize the immigration status of persons present irregularly. In
most cases, though, TPS has turned out to be anything but temporary, with the
affected countries repeatedly re-designated for TPS owing to the continuation of
unstable conditions.145
Foreign countries are designated for TPS only relatively infrequently.
However, over the years, the status has benefitted a substantial number of
persons.146 Thus, over 331,000 nationals of Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador
benefited from stay in the U.S. from TPS designations under this “environmental
disaster” limb following the 1998 Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and Nicaragua
and the 2000 earthquake in El Salvador. Likewise, an additional 55,000 Haitian
nationals received TPS in the U.S. after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The Haiti
designation, though, was done under a separate TPS limb that requires instead
that the U.S. authorities determine the existence of “extraordinary and temporary
conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state
from returning to the state in safety,” unless “permitting the aliens to remain
temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United
States.”147 The 1997 volcanic eruption in Montserrat was designated
simultaneously under both this “extraordinary and temporary conditions” limb
and that relating to “environmental disaster.”
The TPS provision reflects the recognition that wider humanitarian
circumstances beyond the rules of international protection law may legitimately
be considered for stay. Indeed, it is not granted on the basis of any international
obligation. Moreover, its relationship to “international protection” is somewhat
144

See, e.g., Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75 Fed. Reg. 3476 (Jan. 21, 2010)
(illustrating that, in this regard, the re-designation of Haiti in 2011 to offer access to TPS for
Haitians who had been continuously residing in the U.S. from a date prior to one year after the
earthquake is exceptional.); see also Extension and Redesignation of Haiti for Temporary Protected
Status, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,000 (May 19, 2011).

145

Attempts since 2017 by the Trump administration to terminate long-standing TPS designations for
nationals of certain countries continue, at the time of writing, to be litigated before the U.S. courts.
See, e.g., Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp.3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated and remanded by Ramos v.
Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020). The attempts to terminate TPS were apparently pursued by the
administration in the face of advice from the U.S. State Department that this would put national
security, foreign relations, and the beneficiaries’ American-born children at risk. Nicole Narea, State
Department Officials Warned Trump Not to Revoke Protections for Immigrants, VOX (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/DMX2-23C3.

146

See generally JILL H. WILSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS:
OVERVIEW AND CURRENT ISSUES 2, 5 (2020) (illustrating that TPS has also been used for contexts
of war); see also Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://perma.cc/SH48-PMPD (providing full list of TPS countries and designation
documentation).
§ 1254a (b)(1)(C).

147
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tenuous. For instance, while “extraordinary and temporary conditions” at least
speaks to protection concerns in terms of the “safety” of returning nationals, the
“environmental disasters” limb turns on relations between the U.S. and the
disaster-affected state and the latter’s capacity to “adequately” receive returns.
Moreover, even for disasters that meet the formal criteria for one or other limbs,
no legal expectation exists that TPS will be designated. Nor can individuals apply
for protection absent a determination of TPS for their country by the U.S.
authorities, which remains at the complete discretion of the U.S. authorities.
Although legal scholars have criticized TPS on those grounds,148 the analysis here
is not intended to downplay its utility but to simply point out that it reflects a
distinct legal approach not easily aligned with wider notions of international
protection based on the severance of the protection relationship between
individuals and their state of origin and an envisaged risk of serious harm if
returned.
Most scholarship views TPS as an isolated example of states legislating for
mobility in the disaster context. However, a brief review of national refugee law
instruments in the Americas suggests that it actually forms part of a wider
tendency to legislate for discretionary powers to allow entry and stay on broader
humanitarian grounds, particularly where protection claims are not recognized.
These powers have been used to benefit persons affected by disasters. In the
Caribbean, for instance, the power to grant leave to remain to rejected asylumseekers on “humanitarian grounds” was applied by Jamaica to Haitians after the
2010 earthquake.149 Similar powers exist in the refugee laws of the Cayman Islands
and Montserrat in respect of rejected asylum-seekers who cannot be returned for
“obvious and compelling reasons.”150 Suriname allows a residence permit to be
granted to a rejected asylum-seeker if “he cannot in the light of the social and
political situation in his country of origin and his personal circumstances
reasonably be required to return to that country.”151 Like TPS, these provisions
treat the disaster as an event that, in its own right, may engage broader
humanitarian considerations for the entry and stay of persons who do not qualify
for international protection. Rooted in the positive exercise of state discretion in
immigration matters, these provisions in turn reflect a wider approach to
addressing such situations in the broader immigration law of this region.
148

See CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 37–40; see also Bill Frelick, What’s Wrong
with Temporary Protected Status and How to Fix It: Exploring a Complementary Protection Regime, 8 J.
MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 42 (2020).

149

See Refugee Policy, ¶¶ 12(a)(iii), 13(f), 2009 (Jam.), https://perma.cc/U2RB-AT8Y.
Immigration Law (2015 Revision), Law 34/2003, § 84(8) (Cayman Is.), July 17, 2015,
https://perma.cc/SUU8-UDQM; Immigration Act and Subsidiary Legislation, ch. 13.01, § 45(5),
Jan. 1, 2013 (Montserrat), https://perma.cc/68XY-8FEZ.
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Aliens Act 1991, Law Concerning the Admission and the Expulsion of Aliens, art. 17, Jan. 16, 1992,
(Surin.), https://perma.cc/7V3K-4QDC.
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V. I MMIGRATION L AW IN THE A MERICAS
The legal literature on the environment-mobility nexus largely overlooks
how wider immigration law could address international mobility challenges linked
to adverse environmental conditions.152 This partly reflects a perception that the
situation of persons fleeing environmental threats is analogous to that of refugees,
thus requiring international protection rather than immigration relief.153 Yet it also
reflects a tendency to view the problem and its solution in terms of international
law, thus discounting the relevance of immigration law as a field constituted
principally at the national level.154 Indeed, most of the legal scholarship is quite
dismissive of the role of national law in general.155 Even so, in the Pacific region,
certain scholars have argued that international movement linked to climate change
could be accommodated within existing migration mechanisms at the bilateral or
regional level or by making tweaks to national immigration law in common
destination countries in the region such as Australia or New Zealand.156
In the Americas, the insight that immigration law might accommodate
international mobility linked to environmental threats represents an important
starting point for analyzing state practice. Yet, in contrast with the relative paucity
of documented legal practice in other regions of the world, the use of immigration
law to address this mobility challenge by states in the Americas is not merely a
matter of speculation for the future.157 Indeed, the creation by the U.S. of an
“environmental disaster” limb within TPS, which is essentially an immigration law
provision for regularizing status in disaster contexts rather than a tool of
international protection,158 in 1990 is just one early example of pertinent practice
in this region. In Central America, for example, various states adopted legal

152

The same is also true for disaster risk management law and policy frameworks. These mostly
address cross-border mobility issues only in relation to the entry of personnel and assistance to a
disaster-affected state, although some regional disaster risk management forums in the Americas
have recently made general reference to the promotion of mechanisms to receive persons displaced
across borders by a disaster. See CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 26–30.
Yet such provisions seem to remain absent from disaster risk management frameworks at the
national level in the Americas, except in Costa Rica. See MICHELLE YONETANI, PLATFORM ON
DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, MAPPING THE BASELINE: TO WHAT EXTENT ARE DISPLACEMENT AND
OTHER FORMS OF HUMAN MOBILITY INTEGRATED IN NATIONAL AND REGIONAL DISASTER RISK
REDUCTION STRATEGIES? 29–31 (2018), https://perma.cc/8MRL-ZHBQ.
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See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97–98 and accompanying text.
As such, this existing practice also provides a counterpoint to analyses that claim the security fears
of states have prevented them from using immigration law to address mobility linked to
environmental factors. See, e.g., Anastasiou, supra note 65, at 187–89.
See supra notes 143–148 and accompanying text.
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decrees in 1998 to regularize the immigration status of irregular migrants from
other countries in the region that had been devastated by the effects of Hurricane
Mitch.159 In Costa Rica alone, the resulting program regularized around 150,000
disaster-affected migrants.160 It thus seems that the use of national immigration
law in the Americas to resolve mobility challenges linked to the environment
already represents fairly long-standing practice by some states in this region.
This Article advances legal debate on the environment-mobility nexus on
several points. Most importantly, it shows just how widespread the use of
immigration law instruments and concepts to resolve these challenges is among
states in the Americas. It starts by illustrating how “ordinary” migration categories
in national immigration law in this region have accommodated international
mobility challenges linked to environmental factors. It then shows how a range of
“exceptional” migration categories have also been created and deployed by states
to accommodate persons whose legal situation cannot be resolved by application
of “ordinary migration categories.” Overall, this analysis reinforces the impression
of a shift in this region away from treating such challenges as matters of
international protection to an approach based on immigration law.161 This means
that, contrary to the assumptions of the existing legal scholarship, we cannot
simply treat the regulation of mobility in this context as a blank canvas for
international law. Rather, we must acknowledge that a distinctive legal approach
to the problem already exists in the Americas and that it finds articulation among
states not only in the Global North but also in the Global South.

A. “Ordinary” Migration Categories
A standard function of national immigration law is to codify and regulate
access to what we might call “ordinary” migration categories. These ordinary
migration categories usually exist to facilitate migration that is based primarily on
pull factors in the country of destination or, in other words, an actual or
prospective link on the part of the individual applicant with that country.
Examples of short-term ordinary migration categories include such categories as
159

160

161

Decreto No. 27457-G-RE, Reglamento del Régimen de Excepción 1999, LA GACETA [L.G.], Nov.
24, 1998 (Costa Rica), https://perma.cc/NVB5-BC8R; Decreto No. 94-98, 21 Dec. 1998, Para
Ciudadanos Centroamericanos que se Encuentran en el Territorio Nacional, LA GACETA, DIARIO
OFICIAL [L.G.], 7 Jan. 1999 (Nicar.), https://perma.cc/RHA8-X67Z; Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34,
Por el Cual se Dictan Algunas Medidas Administrativas para Legalizar la Residencia Definitiva de
Nacionales de la Republica de Nicaragua, que se Encuentran Indocumentados en el País, GACETA
OFICIAL [G.O.], Feb. 9, 1999 (Pan.), https://perma.cc/DHZ2-EZQT.
ABELARDO MORALES GAMBOA, FLASCO, AMNISTÍA MIGRATOTIA EN COSTA RICA: ANÁLISIS DE
LOS ALCANCES SOCIALES Y DEL IMPACTO DEL RÉGIMEN DE EXCEPCIÓN MIGRATORIA PARA LOS
INMIGRANTES DE ORIGEN CENTROAMERICANO EN COSTA RICA 31 (1999),
https://perma.cc/5NQ4-29E2.
See supra Section IV.
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visits or tourism, while longer-term ones include studies, employment, or joining
family in the country of destination. Thus, as a basis for travel, entry, or stay by
non-nationals, circumstances in the country of origin do not provide the principal
rationale for these categories, which turns rather on certain forms of connection
to the country of destination.162 Even so, and despite the scant attention paid to
these migration pathways in existing legal research on the environment-mobility
nexus, this Article shows that, in the Americas, they have accommodated mobility
linked to environmental factors in a number of important ways.
Firstly, it is clear that these ordinary migration categories are used in practice
by persons leaving a disaster-affected country as a way to enter or stay in another
country. For sudden-onset disasters, the empirical data points to a spike in longterm regular migration to the U.S. from Central America and the Caribbean in the
year after a sudden-onset disaster hits one of those countries.163 For slow-onset
disasters, the documented increase in migration to the U.S. from parts of Mexico
affected by such phenomena provides a similar indication.164 In tandem, shortterm ordinary migration categories have also provided a legal basis for entry by
inhabitants of border regions fleeing the impact of an oncoming sudden
hazardous event on their side of the border.165 In the Americas, the use of such
ordinary migration categories has particular salience. Not only is this a region with
significant intra-regional diaspora populations,166 but in this region international
mobility linked to environmental threats tends to follow existing migration routes
and pathways where possible.167 As a result, in the Americas, the prospect that
people from a disaster-affected country might have family or other links to a
destination country in this region is not remote, especially among those sectors of
society that possess the resources to migrate internationally.
The fact that ordinary migration categories are capable of accommodating a
proportion of international movement linked to environmental push factors has
far-reaching implications for debate about the legal gap in relation to such mobility
and its resolution. On the one hand, it suggests that less of a gap in the law exists
in reality than may be assumed in the abstract. This also implies that “solutions”
must not focus exclusively on creating special new legal regimes for affected
162

163
164
165
166

167

This is the case even for categories, such as those relating to seasonal labor migration, that aim also
to provide a secondary benefit to countries of origin, such as development gains through
remittances, skills acquisition and knowledge transfer, alongside the principal benefit of temporarily
linking foreign workers to gaps in the labor market of the receiving country.
See supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
Organization of American States, International Migration in the Americas: Fourth Report of the
Continuous Reporting System on International Migration in the Americas, OEA/Ser.D/XXVI.2.4
(Dec. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/U436-V9YY.
See examples supra Section III.
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persons but more generally must also seek to ensure that states fairly apply these
ordinary migration categories, especially in relation to disaster-affected
countries.168 The imposition of undue restrictions on such migration categories
might well have a greater negative impact on prospects for the entry and stay of
persons affected by environmental threats than the absence of a dedicated
protection regime. On the other hand, in principle, the fact of the disaster is legally
irrelevant to the application of the ordinary migration categories, which turn
instead on links to the destination country. Indeed, in the Americas, states clearly
treat that criterion as the principal basis for determining the entry or stay of nonnationals, rather than any particular kind of push factor that may exist in the
country of origin.
Secondly, for applicants affected by a disaster, some states in this region
apply the formal criteria of these ordinary migration categories in a flexible
manner. For instance, in Canada, immigration law allows the authorities to
expedite applications under the ordinary migration categories or waive one or
more formal criteria, if justified by “humanitarian and compassionate
considerations.”169 This is applied in response to disaster situations, and, for some
serious disasters, “special measures” policies are adopted by the government that
instruct officials to exercise these powers in order to expedite applications or
waive formal criteria where requested by applicants “seriously and directly
affected” by the disaster.170 Meanwhile, the U.S. standing policy of “temporary
relief measures” encourages immigration officials to exercise their innate
discretion to expedite applications or waive the formal criteria for certain ordinary
migration categories at the request of an individual applicant.171 Based on the
periodic announcements reminding migrants of this policy, these relief measures

168

The use of visa regimes, which are often imposed on poorer countries that are more vulnerable to
the impact of hazards, is a particular cause for concern. In the Americas, the countries whose
nationals are most frequently required to secure a visa for lawful travel to another country within
this region are Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, although many other poor countries in
this region that are regularly affected by disasters do not experience such extensive visa
requirements for travel in the Americas. See CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note
11, at 36, 47, 59.

169

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c 27, s 25 (Can.), https://perma.cc/EYW7M5EY.
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These “special measures” policies have been adopted, inter alia, for the 1998 Turkey earthquake,
the 2004 Asian tsunami, the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.
See CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 33–34.
See Immigration Help Available to Those Affected by Natural Disasters, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://perma.cc/8P8L-J8ZH (Oct. 6, 2017); see also CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE,
supra note 11, at 34–35.
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seem to be applied mainly to those affected by natural disasters, not only overseas
but also in the U.S. itself.172
This flexible approach to the criteria for entry or stay under the ordinary
migration categories is particularly codified in the law and policy of these Global
North states. However, as a legal practice in the Americas, the approach is also
evident among states in the Global South. In Central America, for example, Costa
Rica has applied a broader understanding of the “family” category than normally
permitted by law so that Nicaraguans present irregularly but personally affected
by a sudden-onset disaster in Nicaragua could stay lawfully as family members,
with all the benefits of that regular status.173 Likewise, in South America, Colombia
regularized some Haitians arriving after the 2010 earthquake by flexibly applying
work and student categories.174 In the Caribbean, Dominica and Antigua and
Barbuda relaxed certain eligibility requirements of the ordinary migration
categories for Haitians in 2010.175 In the 2017 hurricane season, territories such as
Montserrat and the British Virgin Islands also lifted immigration restrictions or
waived visa requirements to facilitate entry by affected persons.176 Overall,
assimilating disaster-affected persons to ordinary migration categories has the
advantage of access to ensuing regular status and rights. The states’ flexibility in
this respect contrasts sharply with their rigid application of refugee law,
supporting a view that they see mobility in this context principally as a matter of
immigration law rather than international protection.
Thirdly, these migration pathways are also beginning to be shaped by free
movement accords. At present, citizens of certain subregional integration
mechanisms in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean benefit from
specific forms of treaty-based free movement across borders within the respective

172
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Situational “temporary relief measures” have been announced, inter alia, for such disasters overseas
as: tropical storms in the Caribbean in 2008; the 2010 Icelandic volcano eruption; the 2010 Chile
earthquakes; Tropical Storm Agatha in Guatemala in 2010; the 2011 earthquakes and tsunami in
Japan; extreme flooding in Central America in 2011; Hurricane Sandy in the Caribbean in 2012;
Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013; Hurricane Harvey in the U.S. in 2017; California
Wildfires in 2007 and 2018; Hurricane Florence in the U.S. in 2018; and the 2018 Typhoon
Mangkhut in the Philippines. See Previous Special Situations, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://perma.cc/VMM3-HHQ9 (Nov. 26, 2018) (listing existing announcements of “temporary
relief measures”).
CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 35.
CARIBBEAN MIGRATION CONSULTATIONS, CONSULTATION TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR
REGIONAL COOPERATION ON HUMAN MOBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND THE
ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CARIBBEAN 15 (2019), https://perma.cc/F9JCKGPW.
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bloc.177 Some scholars have already argued in favor of extending free movement
arrangements as a means of facilitating migration in the context of environmental
threats.178 Yet states in the Americas have already begun to use such free
movement provisions specifically to facilitate entry and stay by nationals of a
disaster-affected country in their subregional bloc. For instance, after Hurricane
Maria devastated Dominica in 2017, the authorities in Trinidad and Tobago used
the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, short-term visa-free stay provision to
shelter affected Dominicans.179 In tandem, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, St.
Lucia, and St. Vincent also welcomed Dominicans under the OECS provision for
entry and short-term stay, expediting those cases and waiving documentary
requirements where documents had been lost in the disaster.180 Lacking disasterspecific provisions, these accords now seem to offer additional useful ordinary
migration categories for states to apply in disasters.

B. “Exceptional” Migration Categories
National law also often provides for what we might call “exceptional”
migration categories. These categories usually take the form of general legal
provisions, or powers conferred on immigration officials, created to regulate
special or exceptional situations that fall outside the ordinary migration categories.
They are squarely concerned with areas of immigration law where states enjoy a
wide sovereign discretion, such as where an applicant lacks a substantive
connection to the destination state or where a claim falls under binding rules of
international protection, but other countervailing factors still exist. In the
Americas, pertinent legal practice makes it clear that many states view disasters as
precisely one such factor where special consideration may be required in relation
to the application not only of ordinary migration categories but also these
exceptional migration categories. Given the diversity of legal systems and juridical
perspectives across this region, it is appropriate to analyze exceptional migration
categories, and their application to disaster situations, along a spectrum of
“codification” that reflects the different degrees to which they are expressly
codified by national immigration law.

177

Relevant mechanisms include, respectively, the System for Central-American Integration (SICA),
the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and, for the Caribbean, the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). See CANTOR,
CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 36–37, 47–48 and 59.

178

See, e.g., AMA FRANCIS, COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., FREE MOVEMENT
AGREEMENTS & CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION: A CARIBBEAN CASE STUDY 1, 2 (2019),
https://perma.cc/ZF6K-MB88; Wood, supra note 84; Black et al., supra note 58, at 449.
FRANCIS, supra note 178, at 18.

179
180

Id.; Antigua Prepares for Influx of Dominicans, ST. LUCIA TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/7J6SL89A.
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At one end of this spectrum, the discretionary power to resolve exceptional
immigration cases takes the form of an inherent faculty not specifically codified
by immigration legislation, as is apparently the case in Venezuela.181 A little further
along are states where the existence of this power is confirmed by immigration
law but its scope is left open to the discretion of the national authorities, as in
Colombia and Paraguay.182 Similarly, in the Caribbean, the law in British overseas
territories and former colonies often gives officials the discretion to postpone, or
overlook, deciding whether a non-national falls into one of the categories of
“prohibited” immigrants who must be denied entry and instead granted leave to
stay.183 Crucially, across the Americas, states have exercised this kind of broad
discretionary power to grant entry or stay to disaster-affected persons on a caseby-case basis. In 2010, the Dominican Republic used apparently innate
discretionary powers to grant entry to certain categories of Haitians affected by
the earthquake on a humanitarian basis.184 After Hurricane Irma in 2017, the U.S.
unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico used inherent discretion to grant entry to
thousands of people evacuated from the British Virgin Islands, Dutch Sint
Maarten, and French Saint Martin.185 In Chilean law, a discretionary power to grant
stay in cases outside the ordinary migration categories was applied to benefit a
small number of Haitians after the earthquake.186
However, these broad discretionary powers are also used to facilitate stay on
a group basis. In some cases, this involves creating special regularization programs
to which nationals of the disaster-affected country who are already present
181

See CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 37–39.

182

For example, Colombian law provides for a power to authorize entry and stay on extraordinary
grounds where this is necessary, see Decreto No. 1067, mayo 26, 2015, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.],
art. 2.2.1.11.2.5 (Colom.), as modified by Decreto No. 1325, agosto, 12, 2016,
https://perma.cc/3SG6-99AP. In Paraguay, the law gives the Director General a general
discretionary power to “carry out other acts” necessary with complying with the objectives of the
immigration authorities. See Ley No. 978/96, art. 146(g), June 27, 1996, (Para.),
https://perma.cc/9BDQ-USAJ.
In the Caribbean, this is the case for Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica,
Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the
British Overseas Territories of Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Montserrat. See
CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 60. On the mainland, the same is true
for the former British colonies of Belize and Guyana. Id. at 37, 48. In Canada, officials can grant
temporary resident status to persons who do not meet the requirements of the regular migration
rules where they are “of the opinion that it is justified in the circumstances.” Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, supra note 169, s 24(1) (Can.).
CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 61.

183

184
185

186

Alvin Baez, Puerto Rico Opens Arms to Refugee from Irma’s Caribbean Chaos, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/8LSS-2VGA; Joanna Walters, US Virgin Islands Refusing Entry to Non-American
Irma Evacuees, Survivors Say, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/WHP7-7MFJ.
Decree No. 597 art. 49–50, Aprueba Nuevo Reglamento de Extranjeria, junio 14, 1984, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), https://perma.cc/GL7W-3GBA; see CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 43.
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irregularly in the destination country can apply. In 1998, Central American states
created such regularization programs for migrants from countries affected by
Hurricane Mitch.187 In 2010, similar one-off regularization programs were created
for Haitians present in Ecuador and Venezuela, using broad immigration
discretion based on, respectively, statutory and innate powers.188 Such powers
have also been invoked to create legal measures that fall short of formal stay but
which still temporarily suspend removals to a disaster-affected country on a group
basis. For instance, many states in the Americas drew on broad innate
discretionary powers to temporarily suspend the removal of Haitians after the
2010 earthquake.189 Overall, the breadth of such powers gives states considerable
latitude in fixing the criteria for their application, as well as excluding individuals
in relation to whom security or crime related concerns exist.190 In practice, though,
these broad powers of immigration discretion are exercised by states in the
Americas to the benefit of nationals of a country devastated by a serious suddenonset disaster.
Toward the other end of the codification spectrum are those national laws
that codify when this immigration discretion should be exercised positively. In the
Americas, this usually turns on the existence of “humanitarian” considerations in
the individual case. Although the specific wording varies among countries,191 the
law of at least fifteen states in this region include an exceptional migration category
based on some variation of the concept of “humanitarian considerations.”192 In
187
188

189

See supra notes 158–159and accompanying text.
Decreto No. 248, Feb. 9, 2010 (Ecuador), https://perma.cc/C8VB-8DFP; see also CANTOR, LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 37–39.
They include the U.S., Mexico, Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, as well as the British Turks
and Caicos Islands and the French Antilles territories of Martinique and Guadeloupe. See Michel
Forst, Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, Addendum:
Forced Returns of Haitians from Third States, at 6–7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/35/Add.1 (June 4, 2012);
CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 38, 61, 63.

190

Nonetheless, certain profiles of person, such as those whose cases involve a national security or
serious criminal element, are often deemed ineligible to benefit from these measures. See CANTOR,
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 40–41 (providing a discussion of how this played out
for Haitians in Canada).

191

Examples from Central America include “exceptional humanitarian reasons” (Panama – entry and
stay); “humanitarian cause” (Mexico – entry and stay); “humanitarian motives” (Honduras – entry);
“humanitarian reason” (Costa Rica – entry); “humanitarian reasons” (Guatemala – entry and stay;
Honduras – stay; Mexico – travel and stay; Nicaragua – stay);”humanitarian visa” (Mexico – travel;
Nicaragua – entry and stay);”reasons of humanity” (Costa Rica – stay). See CANTOR, LAW, POLICY
AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 38 n.207, 49 n.306, 60, 63 (concerning South America and the
Caribbean).
By sub-region, those countries include: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama (Central America); Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay (South America);
Trinidad and Tobago, the Dutch Antilles islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba (Caribbean);
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some countries, this concept is not defined further by national immigration law,
leaving the potential for inclusion of disaster victims open to official discretion in
individual cases. This is true of the special residence permit that may be granted
for “humanitarian reasons” in Honduras and the extension of stay category for
“humanitarian reasons” in Nicaragua.193 Likewise, the law in Uruguay allows entry
as a temporary resident to be granted for “exceptional reasons . . . of a
humanitarian character” but does not define what that means.194 In the Caribbean,
the law in Trinidad and Tobago allows leave to remain to be granted if
“humanitarian considerations” that warrant the granting of special relief from
deportation exist,195 similar to the law in the Dutch Antilles.196 In addition, this
immigration law concept is articulated in several national refugee laws.197 None of
these laws further define the “humanitarian considerations” concept but, in
practice, such broad provisions have sometimes been applied by officials to
persons affected by a disaster in their country of origin.198
More commonly, though, and particularly in Latin American countries,
national immigration law more closely defines the scope of “humanitarian
considerations” concept. This is usually done by reference to three general sets of
circumstances, although it is important to point out that not all three are always
codified in the law of any particular state. The circumstances are that the applicant
is: (1) the “victim” of serious adversity, such as grave crimes or human rights

193

194

195

196

197
198

and Mexico (North America). For references to most relevant laws (except El Salvador and
Canada), see CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at Annex D. In Canada, the
authorities have the power to grant permanent resident status if “justified by humanitarian and
compassionate considerations relating to the foreign national.” Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, supra note 169, s 25(1) (Can.). In the new Salvadorian migration law, temporary
resident status can be granted to persons who “for humanitarian reasons . . . justify a special
treatment.” Decreto No. 286, Ley Especial de Migración y de Extranjería, art. 109(20), DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.], Apr. 25, 2019 (El Sal.), https://perma.cc/2KRL-2CGG (author translation).
Decreto No. 208-2003, Ley de Migración y Extranjería, art. 39(13), LA GACETA [L.G.], Mar. 3, 2004
(Hond.), https://perma.cc/R7FU-2DDD (author translation); Decreto No. 31-2012, 20 Sept.
2012, Ley General de Migración y Extranjería, art. 50, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.], 27 Sept.
2012 (Nicar.), https://perma.cc/T26U-ZNMA (author translation).
Ley No. 18.250, Ley de Migraciones, art. 44, 34(b), Dec. 27, 2008 (Uru.), https://perma.cc/X96PX454 (author translation).
Immigration Regulations, ch. 18:01, § 28(1)(b)–(2), Dec. 31, 2016 (Trin. & Tobago),
https://perma.cc/T99Z-KJKU.
For the Dutch Antilles islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba, an official who has doubts
about refusing entry may refer the case to the immigration authorities in the Netherlands who can
decide to grant entry due to, inter alia, “compelling humanitarian reasons,” although this concept is
not further defined. Circulaire toelating en uitzetting Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba oktober 2010,
Stcrt. 2010, § 2.3.6 (Neth.), https://perma.cc/4H6C-QZG5 (translation by author’s colleague).
See supra notes 149–151, 151 and accompanying text.
For instance, in Honduras, the authorities were preparing to receive Haitians in the aftermath of
the 2010 earthquake using these provisions, although none actually arrived. See CANTOR, LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 46.
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violations; or (2) “vulnerable” in the destination country, due to factors such as
age, gender, disability or ill health; or (3) “facing serious danger” to life or integrity
in the country of origin.199 Although this last scenario may resemble a rule of
international protection, its application is usually discretionary. Disaster-affected
persons are sometimes accommodated within such broad renderings of the
“humanitarian considerations” concept. For instance, in 2017, Haitians present
irregularly in Argentina were granted stay under a general provision of this kind,
which was interpreted as applying to natural disasters and their effects.200 Likewise,
the “humanitarian and compassionate” considerations provision of Canadian law
is interpreted as a test of “unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship,”
to be determined by reference to factors that include conditions in the country of
origin, particularly those that have “a direct negative impact on the applicant such
as . . . natural disasters.”201
However, the opposite end of this codification spectrum actually consists of
the growing number of immigration law provisions in the region that specify
disasters as a “humanitarian consideration” or otherwise as the basis for an
exceptional migration category. Ten states across the Americas take this
approach,202 with the tendency particularly accentuated in South America and
North America but also becoming increasingly common in Central America. 203
The ubiquity of these provisions supports the analysis that states in the Americas
view international mobility linked to environmental factors not through the lens
of international protection, but principally through the lens of immigration law as
an integral expression of their asserted sovereign right to determine who is allowed
entry and stay in the territory of the state, treating the humanitarian impact of
disasters as a legal basis for exercising state discretion in favor of affected persons.
Starting with South America, national immigration law in Argentina
stipulates that transitory residence for “humanitarian reasons” can be granted to
those who “temporarily cannot return to their countries of origin . . . due to

199

For examples of these factors the national law of countries in Central America and South America,
see CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 38–39, 49–51. For Canada, the
applicable provision is the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s 25(1.21). Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, supra note 169, s 25 (Can.).

200

Disposition No. E 1143/2017, preamble, Mar. 15, 2017, [33588] B.O. 23 (Arg.),
https://perma.cc/N2BD-HALH.

201

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, The Humanitarian and Compassionate Assessment: Hardship
and the H&C Assessment (Mar. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/85QQ-KJ84.

202

They are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and
the U.S.

203

Currently, in the Caribbean, states are also reported to be considering how to make legal provision.
See CARIBBEAN MIGRATION CONSULTATIONS, supra note 176, at 15.
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consequences generated by natural or man-made environmental disasters.”204
Brazil authorizes “humanitarian reception” for a person from “any country in a
situation of . . . major calamity [or] environmental disaster.”205 Ecuador gives stay
for “humanitarian reasons,” including being “a victim of natural or environmental
disasters.”206 Peru authorizes “humanitarian residence” where migration is due to
“natural and environmental disasters.”207 Meanwhile, Bolivian law makes
provision for the admission of persons at risk due to climate effects or disasters.208
Similarly, in North America, for the purpose of granting a humanitarian visa to a
non-national outside the country, Mexico defines “humanitarian reasons” as
meaning that the person seeking to travel to Mexico “finds herself in a situation
of danger to her life or integrity owing to . . . a duly accredited natural disaster”209
or that she is “victim of a natural catastrophe.”210 Albeit not expressly based on
the concept of “humanitarian considerations,” immigration law in the U.S., as
already mentioned, gives authorities the discretion to designate TPS for, inter alia,
an “environmental disaster.”211 In Canada, national law likewise allows temporary

204

Law No. 25871, art. 24(h), Dec. 17, 2003, [30322] B.O. 2 (Arg.) (author translation); Decree No.
616/2010, art. 24(h), May 3, 2010, [31898] B.O. 6 (Arg.), https://perma.cc/492W-PDAH.

205

Lei No. 13.445, de 24 de maio de 2017, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.]: art. 30 de 25.05.2017
(Braz.), https://perma.cc/L9J3-ACTZ (author translation); Decreto No. 9.199, de 20 de novembro
de 2017, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.]: art. 145 de 21.11.2017 (Braz.), https://perma.cc/2T363NB3 (author translation).

206

Ley Orgánica de Movilidad Humana, art. 58, 66(5), 2017 (Ecuador), https://perma.cc/K46AFZ3N, translated in Organic Law on Human Mobility: Supplement Official Registry 938, REFWORLD (Feb.
6, 2017), https://perma.cc/D5TJ-V4S7; Decreto Ejecutivo No. 111, Reglamento a la Ley Orgánica
de Movilidad Humana, art. 55, 2017 (Ecuador), https://perma.cc/2ALL-DQBY (author
translation).
Decreto Legislativo No. 1350, Ley y Reglamento de Migraciones, art. 29(2)(k), Jan. 1, 2017 (Peru),
https://perma.cc/3S69-BRGB (author translation).
The law charges the Bolivian migration authorities to “make viable, as necessary, the admission of
populations displaced by climate effects, when a risk or threat to their lives may exist, where those
are due to natural causes or environmental, nuclear [or] chemical disasters or hunger.” Ley No. 370,
Ley de Migración, art. 65, May 8, 2013 (Bol.), perma.cc/P2EV-ECD7 (author translation). The law
in Bolivia provides a unique definition of “Climate Migrants” as “[g]roups of persons who are
forced to displaced from one State to another due to climate effects, when a risk or threat to their
life may exist, whether due to natural causes, environmental, nuclear [or] chemical disasters or
hunger.” Id. art. 4(16).
Ley de Migración [LM], art. 41, 116(I)(b), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 25-5-2011, últimas
reformas DOF 03-07-2019 (Mex.) (author translation).
Lineamientos Generales para la Expedición de Visas que Emiten las Secretarías de Gobernación y
de Relaciones Exteriores, Del Procedimiento para Solicitar Visa, Trámite 9, Criterios de Resolución
a.ii., Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 10-10-2014 (Mex.) (author translation) [hereinafter
General Guidelines for the Issuance of Visas].
See supra notes 142–146 and accompanying text.
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suspension of removals, inter alia, due to an “environmental disaster resulting in
a substantial temporary disruption of living conditions” in the country of origin.212
More recently, in Central America, some states have adopted new
immigration laws that also refer to disasters in exceptional migration categories
based on humanitarian considerations. For example, in Guatemala, the existence
of a “natural catastrophe in neighboring countries, which obliges the persons or
group of persons to flee for their lives” is listed among the “humanitarian reasons”
for legal entry and stay.213 In El Salvador, factors to be taken into account by
immigration officials in deciding temporary resident applications based on
“humanitarian reasons” specifically include, inter alia, the existence of an
“internationally-recognized crisis” or that any non-national who does not meet
the criteria for an ordinary migration category is in “a situation of vulnerability or
danger to life owing to … natural disasters [or] environmental [disasters].”214
Overall, legal practice in the Americas shows that surprisingly few states have
not applied such exceptional migration categories as a matter of national
immigration law to accommodate disaster-affected persons whose legal situation
cannot be resolved via ordinary migration categories. Indeed, there is no real
absence of legal tools to resolve the challenge of entry and stay in light of
prevailing humanitarian considerations in this mobility context, and these tools
are applied in practice. Yet, while some ordinary migration categories may provide
permanent stay, exceptional migration categories mostly give temporary stay. The
initial period varies between one year (for example, Costa Rica) and six years (for
example, Panama), although this is normally renewable and can offer a pathway
to longer forms of stay under ordinary migration categories. Such stay also usually
affords the entitlements to work and access services specified by immigration law
in that country. Indeed, in many countries, these immigration categories provide
a defined regular status, a period of stay and a range of rights no less favorable
than those conferred by refugee status.215

212

213

214

215

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 230 (Can.). For details of how
this was applied in the Haitian case, see CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 40–
41.
Decreto No. 44, Código de Migración, art. 68, Oct. 23, 2016 (Guat.), https://perma.cc/7FUBZFL5 (author translation).
Decreto No. 35, Reglamento de la Ley Especial de Migración y de Extranjería, art. 181(2), 181(7),
May 24, 2019, 2019 (El Sal) (author translation).
Although they do not benefit from any specific guarantee against refoulement, such issues do not
easily arise in the disaster context. Indeed, most disaster migrants in the Americas do not strictly
require “protection” from their own state by another state. Likewise, the mere fact of a disaster
does not automatically turn removal into refoulement, only where disaster conditions are so serious
that human rights standards will anyway temporarily prohibit removals. Finally, disaster migrants
already established in the destination country may also be protected indirectly from any return or
potential refoulement by due process guarantees in law against the arbitrary expulsion of aliens.
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Finally, the legal practice in the Americas raises a question about the kinds
of environmental threats that such measures accommodate. Here, the empirical
evidence shows that people who move in the context of both sudden- and slowonset disasters have both been accommodated under ordinary migration
categories. However, where the disaster is expressly contemplated as a basis for
entry or stay, whether in the flexible application of ordinary migration categories
or via exceptional migration categories, the legal practice in the Americas suggests
that such provisions are mostly applied by national immigration authorities to
resolve the situation of persons affected by major sudden-onset disasters. On its
face, this seems to confirm the preoccupation of scholars that persons who
migrate as a result of the impact of slow-onset disasters will be denied access to
such special measures because the link to mobility is easier to establish in the
context of sudden-onset disasters.216 The implicit requirement of most states as a
matter of law or practice is that a person must be directly and seriously affected
by the disaster in order to benefit from the application of such special measures
might seem to further reinforce this risk, since that link seems more
straightforward to evidence in situations of sudden-onset disasters as compared
to slow-onset processes.
At the same time, many of the national law provisions underpinning these
special measures—under both ordinary and exceptional migration categories—do
not refer expressly to a “disaster” but rather to broader “humanitarian
considerations.”217 In principle, then, they do not rule out the application of these
special measures to persons affected, on the one hand, by slow-onset disasters, or,
on the other, by sudden- or slow-onset hazards or hazardous events that have not
resulted in a disaster at the societal level. Moreover, not one of the provisions that
refer to disaster situations as a basis for special measures gives any reason to think
that slow-onset disasters fall outside their scope.218 It is also the case that several
of these provisions refer to “calamities” or “catastrophes” alongside, or instead
of, “disasters,”219 suggesting concepts which could equally include hazardous
events more generally. Further, as to the origins of the events, these provisions

216

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

217

See supra notes 190–214 and accompanying text. The same is true for similar provisions in national
legislation on international protection. See supra notes 148–150 and accompanying text.

218

Indeed, the provision in Bolivian law specifically includes wider “climate effects.” See Ley No. 370,
supra note 208, art. 65 (Bol.).

219

Alongside the “disaster” concept, the provision in Brazilian law refers to “major calamity.” See Lei
No. 13.445, supra 205, art. 30. That in Mexican law refers to “catastrophe.” See General Guidelines
for the Issuance of Visas, supra note 210. The provision in Guatemalan law refers to a “catastrophe”
rather than a disaster. See Decreto No. 44, supra note 213, art. 68.
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often refer to “natural” disasters or catastrophes,220 although many refer also,221 or
instead,222 to “environmental” disasters or catastrophes. The latter concept
appears to include events that are “man-made” in origin.223 In short, although the
current practice may be to apply special measures mainly to persons who are
seriously and directly affected by major sudden-onset disasters linked to natural
hazards, relevant national law provisions suggest that a broader set of scenarios
may ultimately be contemplated.

VI. I NTERNATIONAL C OOPERATION AND F RAMEWORKS IN
THE A MERICAS
In the Americas, state practice in relation to the challenge posed by
international mobility linked to environmental adversity also takes the form of
joint action at the international level.224 This practice plays out principally in
forums concerned with migration rather than international protection and at the
level of subregional initiatives rather than regional or global forums. Crucially, the
main focus of such joint action is on promoting appropriate legal responses to the
challenge by participating states at the level of national law rather than creating
new treaty law. However, the scope of cooperative ambition has increased over
time. Thus, while early forms of collective action represented ad hoc responses to
the devastation wrought by certain very serious disasters, since the mid-2010s,
several subregional forums have been engaged in developing normative
frameworks that promote more predictable responses at the level of national law.
As yet, states appear to be content with this form of international action and no
serious efforts have been made to “harden” the legal character of these
frameworks through creating treaties. Even so, the existence and scope of these
frameworks raise important questions about the future development of
international law in this field.
220

221

222

223

224

The law in Mexico refers to natural disasters or catastrophes. See Ley de Migración, supra note 209,
art. 41. While the law in Guatemala refers only to natural catastrophes. See Decreto No. 44, supra
note 213, art. 68).
For the respective legal provisions in Ecuador, see Ley Orgánica de Movilidad Humana, supra 206,
art. 58; Peru, see Decreto Legislativo No. 1350, supra 207, art. 29(2)(k); Bolivia, see Ley No. 370,
supra note 208, art. 65; and El Salvador, see Decreto No. 35, supra note 214, art. 181, which refers
to natural and environmental disasters.
For the respective legal provisions in the U.S., see supra notes 143–147 and accompanying text; and
for Canada’s reference to “environmental” disasters, see Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s. 230.
For instance, the legal provision in Argentina refers to “natural or man-made environmental
disasters.” See Law No. 25871, supra note 204, art. 24(h). The Bolivian provision adds “nuclear [or]
chemical disasters or hunger” too. See Ley No. 370, supra note 208, art. 65.
Other legal studies appear to overlook the extent of such existing practice on precisely this issue at
the international level in the Americas. See, e.g., Pires Ramos & de Salles Cavdeon-Capdeville, supra
note 11.
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A. Early Ad Hoc Actions
State practice at the subregional level is relatively well-established in the
Americas. Certainly, state cooperation regarding the challenges of the
international mobility posed by sudden-onset disasters is not new in this region.
However, the early instances of state practice at the subregional level tend to
involve the collective recognition of the international mobility consequences of
certain extremely serious sudden-onset disasters and the promotion of suitable
responses at the level of national law. This is evident in the way that states in such
subregional forums responded to the devastation wrought by Hurricane Mitch. In
1998, for instance, the Meeting of Central American Presidents appealed for:
. . . the understanding of the International Community [sic] in order that a
general amnesty be conceded to undocumented Central American
immigrants who currently reside in different countries, with the objective of
avoiding their deportation and, consequentially, greater aggravation of the
current situation of our countries.225

At the national level, this declaration by the four most affected states facilitated
the designation of TPS for Hondurans and Nicaraguans by the U.S. as well as the
adoption of special measures for affected persons in national immigration law by
various Central American states.226
The mobility impact of Hurricane Mitch was also addressed by other
subregional forums, albeit also in an ad hoc or responsive manner. Thus, in early
1999, the matter was raised by states participating in the Regional Conference on
Migration (RCM), a specialized regular subregional forum for facilitating joint
discussion and action on shared migration challenges among a wider constituency
of eleven member states, mostly from North and Central America. In the resulting
Communication, the RCM member states “made special mention of the adoption,
by Costa Rica and the United States of America, of migration measures benefiting
nationals of the countries affected by Hurricane Mitch.”227 Both subregional
forums, then, called not only for a common response on the part of states to the
international challenges posed by this particularly serious disaster but also for the
use of national immigration law by relevant states to resolve those challenges.
225

Reunión Extraordinaria de Presidentes Centroamericanos: Declaración Conjunta, Comalapa, El
Salvador, ¶ 16, Nov. 9, 1998, perma.cc/9MLH-AK66, translated in U.N. General Assembly, Letter
dated 10 November 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/53/656 (Nov. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Meeting of
Central American Presidents].
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For Central American examples, see supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text. A copy of the
declaration that was sent to the U.S. with a letter drawing attention to this plea appears to have
influenced the granting of TPS. See Meeting of Central American Presidents, supra note 225, at 8.
Communicado Conjunto: IV Conferencia Regional sobre Migración, ¶ 4, Jan. 26–29, 1999,
https://perma.cc/CVF6-KCZT, translated in Joint Communique IV Regional Conference, INT’L ORG. FOR
MIGRATION U.N. MIGRATION (1999), https://perma.cc/Y27G-ELLM.
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Yet Hurricane Mitch is not the only disaster where such responsive collective
action manifested itself. Indeed, subregional forums across the Americas also
promoted these kinds of special immigration law measures as a form of collective
response to the overwhelming impact of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. For instance,
in 2010, the twelve states which at that time comprised the subregional Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR) adopted a collective decision to promote
“joint actions.” That UNASUR decision specifically exhorted “those Member
States that still have not applied special processes of migratory regularisation for
the benefit of Haitian citizens to do so.”228 Likewise, the subregional Bolivarian
Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA), comprised at that time of nine
mostly left-leaning governments, called on member states to “decree a migratory
amnesty that regularizes the migratory status of Haitian citizens resident in ALBA
countries.”229 As a result, several states that were involved in one or both forums
went on to adopt special migratory measures into national law for the benefit of
Haitians present irregularly on their territories.230
These examples demonstrate that, from the 1990s to the early 2010s, many
states in the Americas participated in subregional forums that took joint action on
international mobility linked to environmental adversity. The responsive and ad
hoc nature of such action is immediately apparent. It manifested only following
the occurrence of extremely serious sudden-onset disasters that posed
humanitarian challenges suddenly across the pertinent subregion on a significant
scale. On the mobility aspect of these challenges, they were clearly seen through
the prism of immigration law rather than international protection. In particular,
these subregional forums sought to promote, on a humanitarian basis, the
immigration regularization of nationals of the affected state who were present
irregularly elsewhere. As such, the joint action taken by states during this period
was thus oriented toward encouraging a common response at the national law
level, in the form of special migratory measures, rather than creating new
international frameworks for the future.

B. Promoting Frameworks for Cooperation
Since the mid-2010s, states in several subregional forums in the Americas
have been working to develop normative frameworks for promoting a more
predictable response at the national level to future disaster displacement and
cooperation between states at the subregional level. In this process, the influence
228

Solidaridad de UNASUR con Haití: Decisión de Quito, ¶ 6, 2010, https://perma.cc/DM7Y-HETF
(author translation).
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Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, Plan para la Contribución Solidaria de los
Países del ALBA al Esfuerzo del Reconstrucción de Haití, proposal 6 (Jan. 25, 2010),
https://perma.cc/GKL9-6ZYZ (author translation).
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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of external actors has been central to encouraging states to build in this way on
past practice at national and subregional levels. That work was led initially by the
Nansen Initiative (2012–2015)—a global intergovernmental process focused on
disaster displacement—and is being continued by its successor initiative, the
Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) (2016).231 Even so, states in each
subregion have clearly drawn on the expertise and other resources offered by this
external actor to shape normative tools that they view as useful in responding to
the challenges posed by potentially increasing levels of international mobility
linked to disasters.
The development of the pertinent subregional frameworks in the Americas
has taken place mainly in interstate forums concerned with cooperation on
migration issues rather than international protection. Nonetheless, in 2014,
engagement by the Nansen Initiative at the regional level resulted in Latin
American and Caribbean states recognizing the “challenges posed by climate
change and natural disasters, as well as by the displacement of persons across
borders that these phenomena may cause in the region” in the Brazil Declaration
on Refugees.232 The accompanying Brazil Plan of Action of 2014 called on the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to
prepare a study on this theme in order to facilitate “regional cooperation.”233 That
study, commissioned by UNHCR and the PDD (as successor to the Nansen
Initiative), was published in 2018; it fed into the South American and Caribbean
subregional processes described below. However, it seems that no further
measures were taken at the regional level.234
In tandem, the Nansen Initiative had been working with states at the
subregional level. In 2013, a Central America consultation recommended that a
set of guidelines drawing on national practice be developed through the
subregional RCM forum.235 On the proposal of Costa Rica, this was approved by
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For a description of the approach, see Platform on Disaster Displacement, supra note 63, at 126,
141. See generally Jane McAdam, From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shaping
International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, 39 UNIV. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1518
(2016).
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International Protection of Refugees, Displaced and Stateless Persons in Latin America and the
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Id. at Chapter Seven (Plan). The study was published by UNHCR and PDD in 2018. See generally
CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11.
See generally CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11.
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NANSEN INITIATIVE, DISASTERS AND CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
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the RCM.236 In 2016, based on a study commissioned by the Nansen Initiative,237
the RCM adopted nonbinding guidance on “Protection for Persons moving across
Borders in the Context of Disasters.”238 A similar process in South America,
initiated in 2015, led to a proposal by Chile to develop guidelines through the
South American Conference on Migration (SCM), a subregional forum of twelve
South American states.239 In 2018, with support from the PDD, the SCM in turn
adopted its own nonbinding “Regional Guidelines on Protection and Assistance
for Persons Displaced across Borders and Migrants in Countries affected by
Disasters of Natural Origin.”240
Since 2019, the PDD (as successor to the Nansen Initiative) has sought to
build on this engagement elsewhere in the Americas by supporting a similar
process of consultation in the Caribbean through the subregional migration forum
of the Caribbean Migration Consultations (CMC).241 In 2019, at the first Caribbean
consultation, the 2018 UNHCR study requested by Latin American and Caribbean
states in the 2014 Brazil Plan of Action was presented to participants. The
participating states framed the new challenges at regional and national levels as a
priority “in a context of increased migration and displacement linked with climate
change and disasters.”242 As a next step, those same states agreed on the need to
“systematize approaches, harmonize them, and come up with consolidated
policies through collaboration.”243 In the coming years, the creation of a similar
subregional framework in the Caribbean, thus, looks like a possibility.
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XIX Conferencia Regional Sobre Migración: Declaración [XIX Regional Migration Conference:
Declaration], decision 6, June 26–27, 2014, perma.cc/J62D-U5EZ, translated in XIX Regional
Conference on Migration (RCM), INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (2014), https://perma.cc/R9YS-C7MP.
See generally CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11.
NANSEN INITIATIVE, A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE PRACTICES FOR RCM MEMBER COUNTRIES:
PROTECTION FOR PERSONS MOVING ACROSS BORDERS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS (2016),
https://perma.cc/G7PC-968R [hereinafter RCM GUIDE].
The process within the SCM was initiated in 2016. However, this built on a regional workshop with
South American states that was convened in Quito during 2015 by the government of Ecuador, the
Nansen Initiative, and the Refugee Law Initiative of the School of Advanced Study, University of
London.
CONFERENCIA SURAMERICANA SOBRE MIGRACIÓNES, LINEAMIENTOS REGIONALES EN MATERIA
DE PROTECCIÓN Y ASISTENCIA A PERSONAS DESPLAZADAS A TRAVÉS DE FRONTERAS Y MIGRANTES
EN PAÍSES AFECTADOS POR DESASTRES DE ORIGEN NATURAL (2018), https://perma.cc/3PHHWE5Z [hereinafter SCM GUIDELINES].
See generally CARIBBEAN MIGRATION CONSULTATIONS, supra note 176.
Id. at 10.
Id.
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C. Subregional Frameworks: Approach and Scope
The guidelines adopted by the RCM and the SCM represent a significant
addition to state practice. They reflect the views and approval of the large number
of participating states in the subregions of North and Central America (through
the RCM) and South America (through the SCM). Equally, as a result, their
guidance extends to that same range of member states across the Americas.
Moreover, as the first international instruments expressly oriented toward
regulation of international mobility in the context of disasters, they provide a
crucial indication of how states in this region legally frame these aspects of the
environment-mobility nexus. The approaches taken in the RCM Guide and the
SCM Guidelines thus offer useful insight into how, in the future, international law
may come to relate to the challenges posed by international mobility in the context
of environmental adversity.
There is considerable consistency in the approaches adopted by both the
RCM Guide and the SCM Guidelines. Those points of convergence give an
important indication of how states frame the key issues. At the outset, though,
certain drafting differences between the two instruments must be acknowledged.
Most crucially, they differ in how the guidance is presented. The RCM Guide
describes its normative framework as “effective practices” and gives significant
detail on each, while the SCM sets out broader “general guidelines” on purported
“minimum standards.”244 Yet, in reality, any difference lies merely in the greater
or lesser degree of detail that each instrument provides on the norms affirmed.
The scope of intervention that each instrument envisages differs somewhat too.
The RCM Guide mainly addresses immigration and consular authorities on
measure for the benefit of affected persons post-disaster. That scenario is covered
by the SCM Guidelines, but they also promote a “whole of government” approach
to avoid the risk of displacement from the outset.245 In this sense, the SCM
Guidelines have broader scope.
Nonetheless, on the key question of how host states should regulate
international mobility in the context of disasters, the instruments are highly
consistent in their approach. Firstly, they evidence a view by states that new
international law norms are not required. They do not “create a new set of state
obligations, extend existing state obligations, or require that new laws be
passed.”246 Rather, the instruments are intended only to “support the more
effective and consistent use of existing law, policy and practice” by states.247 The
244

See SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 15–16.
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Id. at 28. Indeed, alongside the many examples throughout the text, this is one the orienting
principles of the SCM Guidelines.
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RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 8; see also SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 15, 25.
RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 8; see also SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 15.
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body of existing national law in member states is thus seen as sufficient to respond
to the challenges of this scenario. In tandem, such national law is also affirmed as
the main basis for the resulting normative frameworks, which merely provide
guidance on how to apply it.248 This approach of building from existing national
law and practice is distinct from other soft law instruments which either express
aspirational norms lacking a firm basis in existing law or interpret hard rules of
international law in their application to a particular group or theme.
Secondly, both the RCM Guide and the SCM Guidelines treat this area as
principally a matter of immigration law. The frameworks are primarily built upon
the national practice of states in each subregion of favorably exercising their
discretion in immigration matters where “humanitarian grounds,” such as a
disaster exist.249 Accordingly, each instrument also acknowledges that states retain
the inherent discretion to adopt more generous approaches than those described
in the subregional norms.250 International obligations are acknowledged but are
incorporated mainly as a set of parameters that may limit the extent to which states
can decline to favorably exercise discretion in some situations, rather than the core
legal basis for resulting measures.251 Moreover, both instruments address the legal
challenges not only for people arriving due to a disaster in their own country, but
also for people already outside their own country who are affected by a disaster
there or by a disaster in the country in which they are living or through which they
are transiting.252
Thirdly, the norms in both instruments are rooted principally in the use of
ordinary and exceptional migration categories.253 Both guides distinguish the
(humanitarian) protection afforded by these categories from international
protection,254 which each highlights as relevant to disaster displacement only in
rare cases. Moreover, each instrument promotes active forms of cooperation
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See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 9; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 14–15.
See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 13; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 20–25, 33.
See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 9; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 15.
See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 13–15; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 34.
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See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 10–11; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 16. Indeed, each
instrument sets out a range of relevant principles and norms relating to protection and assistance
for migrants in a disaster-affected country. See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 24–36; SCM
GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 39–42. These norms correlate with those described by another
migration-oriented set of guidelines, on migrants in countries in crisis, prepared at the global level
by the International Organization for Migration with input from states. See, e.g., MIGRANTS IN
COUNTRIES IN CRISIS INITIATIVE, GUIDELINES TO PROTECT MIGRANTS IN COUNTRIES
EXPERIENCING CONFLICT OR NATURAL DISASTER (2016), https://perma.cc/9ZG5-FTV9.
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See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 11–12; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 34.
See SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 24–25 (providing a broad definition of “protection” in
Part 3.2, as compared with the emphasis on lack of protection in the definition of “international
protection” and indeed “complementary protection” at Part 3.2).

254

316

Vol. 21 No. 2

Environment, Mobility, and International Law

Cantor

between the host state and state of origin,255 including: bilateral measures to
further cooperation and mutual assistance, especially where they share a border,256
and, in solidarity with a country of origin that lacks capacity to receive returns,
granting entry or stay to persons only tangentially affected by a disaster.257 The
SCM framework is expressly based on coordination between these two states,258
and it even posits a principle of “shared responsibility” between them, especially
if both are SCM members.259 Thus, in each subregional forum, it seems that states
do not generally view the situation of disaster-affected persons through an
“international protection” lens.
Finally, neither the RCM Guide nor the SCM Guidelines attempt to create a
new legal status. Rather, they simply distill from the legal practice of states in each
subregion a consensus approach to when the discretion to allow entry or stay on
humanitarian grounds should usually be positively exercised in disaster contexts.
This is when the person is “directly and seriously affected by the disaster.”260 Some
interpretation of this concept is provided by the RCM Guide.261 The emphasis is
squarely on the proximity and severity of the disaster’s impact on the individual,
in light of any pre-existing vulnerabilities. In other words, unlike the established
concepts of international protection, it is not based on a rupture in the political
link between an individual and their state of origin or a risk of their fundamental
human rights standards being violated there.
The interpretation in the RCM Guide of a disaster’s direct impact as a
“sudden and severe change” suggests slow-onset disasters are not included.262 This
is confirmed by the guide’s affirmation that it applies only to disasters “caused in
part or in whole by a sudden and serious natural hazard.”263 By contrast, the SCM
Guidelines expressly include other slow-onset disasters and events “that may be
associated with adverse effects of climate change” when they contribute in
255

For instance, the RCM Guide describes the elements of the “cooperative humanitarian response”
among RCM member states as including the exchange of information, requests to apply
humanitarian protection measures to affected nationals and other forms of bilateral cooperation.
See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 27–28. The SCM Guidelines describe a range of cooperative
measures between affected SCM member states based on the principles of “international
cooperation” and “co-responsibility.” See SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 20, 22–23.
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See SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 15.
Id. at 22–23.
RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 15; see SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 31.
See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 16.
Id.
Id. at 9–10. At the same time, it extends the concept of “directly and seriously affected by the
disaster” to situations where “in rare cases an imminent [disaster] creates a substantial risk to [the
person’s] life or safety in the country of origin.” RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 16.
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fundamental ways to the affected person’s decision to cross an international
border.264 Otherwise, though, the terms of each instrument strongly suggest that
the principal concern is with “disasters,” a concept defined by reference to the
extant U.N. policy.265 As such, it seems that hazards or hazardous events that do
not reach the implicit threshold for societal impact will fall generally outside the
scope of the guidance and be left purely to the discretion of national state
authorities.
Despite their recent adoption, these two subregional instruments have
already begun to shape state practice in the Americas. For example, in the RCM
Guide, the principles on bilateral cooperation have been acted upon by some
states. Costa Rica and Panama have broken new ground in the subregion of
Central America by developing from earlier drafts of the RCM Guide shared by
PDD a set of bilateral mechanisms and policies to manage displacement and
disaster risks.266 These include a set of draft Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) for their respective disaster response systems to address cross-border
displacement in disaster contexts.267 The structure, principles, and rules in the
SOPs are based directly on the RCM Guide. Simulation exercises to put the SOPs
into practice have been carried out jointly by the two countries, again with the
involvement of PDD.268 Similarly, the RCM Guide facilitated coordination
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua to allow 150 Nicaraguans to cross the border
and shelter in Costa Rica from the effects of Hurricane Otto in 2016.269
The two subregional instruments, and the processes that led to their
adoption, also seem to have encouraged states in Central and South America to
incorporate national law provisions to specifically regulate the entry and stay of
persons affected by a disaster when revising their immigration laws. Since the
Nansen Initiative started work on its consultations in those regions in 2013, at
least five states in these subregions have adopted significant new provisions of
national law specific to the situation of disaster-affected non-nationals when
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See SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 16.
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They thus reflect later and earlier versions of this concept in UN policy post- and pre-2016. See
SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 24; RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 9–10. For a discussion of
the U.N. approach to defining the concept, see supra notes 41, 44–49 and accompanying text.
See International Organization for Migration, Costa Rica and Panama Prepare for Cross-Border DisasterDisplacement, PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT (Aug. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/F53MJC3M.
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Government of Costa Rica/Government of Panama, Procedimientos Operativos para la atención
de personas desplazadas a través de fronteras en contextos de desastre [Operating procedures for
the care of cross-border refugees in the case of disaster] (May 2017) (copy on file with author).
Int’l Org. for Migration, Costa Rica and Panama Effectuate First Border Crossing Simulation, PLATFORM
ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT (Aug. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/T8Q8-8FCA.
See Platform on Disaster Displacement, supra note 63, at 126, 141.
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overhauling their immigration legislation. They are Guatemala (2016),270 Brazil
(2017),271 Ecuador (2017),272 Peru (2017),273 and El Salvador (2019).274 Paraguay is
also reported to be considering such provisions as it debates adoption of a new
immigration law.275
Finally, the legal practice of states in the Americas has also had an impact on
policy development at the global level. In 2015, the Nansen Initiative presented
an Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the context
of Disasters and Climate Change (Protection Agenda), which—based on seven
regional consultations with states and other actors—sets out norms for
responding to cross-border disaster displacement.276 At that conference, over 100
states from different regions endorsed these global guidelines.277 However, on
closer study, it is evident that the approach and many of the more novel norms
described by the Protection Agenda for “protecting cross-border disasterdisplaced persons” are derived principally from state practice in the Americas. 278
Even so, in 2018, the approach in the Protection Agenda was endorsed by the
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration as a basis for developing
“coherent approaches to address the challenges of migration movements in the
context of sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters.”279
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See Ley Orgánica de Movilidad Humana, supra 206, art. 58, 66(5) (Ecuador).
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VII. C ONCLUSION
This Article contributes to the debate on how international law should
address international mobility in the context of environmental threats. As a whole,
this Article illustrates how greater engagement with different kinds of evidence on
the empirical dynamics of movement and existing legal practice by states in one
region may shed light on broader questions about the current and future role of
international law in shaping this response. The contention that legal scholars
working on this aspect of the law should reflect more carefully on the empirical
framing of the assumed underlying problem is not new. In this regard, the present
Article merely adds new elements to existing scholarship on the implications of
the empirical data on environmental threats and human mobility. However, it also
makes a more ambitious claim, namely that discussion of the role of international
law in this field cannot be divorced entirely from proper consideration of existing
legal practice at the national level. In other words, legal scholars interested in how,
in cross-border contexts, international law could or should address
environmentally displaced persons, climate refugees, or the disaster-displaced—
to use only a few contemporary terms—cannot continue to discount national legal
practice as if it were irrelevant. What, then, are the principal implications of this
Article for our understanding of international law development in response to this
perceived legal problem?
On the underlying empirical dynamics, beyond the much-cited risk posed by
rising sea levels in the Pacific, the growing evidence base from the Americas
confirms that international mobility in this region is already being shaped by
sudden-onset events, such as hurricanes, storms, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions
and flooding, as well as slow-onset processes, such as desertification and droughts.
It has been argued here that, although the concept of disasters is a useful starting
point for understanding how these events contribute to the movement of persons,
a broader focus on the underlying hazards and hazardous events may better
capture the wider ways in which these phenomena can shape mobility, even where
a disaster does not result at societal level. In tandem, contrary to assumptions in
the legal literature that the resulting movement is an issue only for the Global
North, data from this region show that some of this movement also extends to
countries in the Global South. As such, this Article contends that the legal practice
and perspectives of Global South states need to be incorporated alongside those
of states in the Global North in considering the development of law in this field.
Moreover, beyond a narrow focus on movement “pushed” by hazards, this Article
demonstrates how such hazards, in countries of destination and transit as well as
countries of origin, impinge on international mobility issues in other legallyrelevant ways. Indeed, the risk is that if we continue to frame the issue as one of
extending international protection to persons fleeing disaster-affected countries,
we lose sight of the fact that similar legal gaps in relation to travel, entry, and stay
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also exist for non-nationals whose mobility is affected by hazards in countries of
destination and transit. We also risk stretching refugee law, and wider concepts of
international protection, to its breaking point.
On the framing of the legal problem, it is true that international law only
tangentially regulates the international mobility related challenges of travel, entry,
and stay of non-nationals in the context of environmental threats. However, the
existence of a gap in international law does not mean that no law exists, nor does
it imply that proposed solutions to the problem can start from a blank canvas.
Instead, this Article shows that many states in this region have long recognized
the challenges involved and also developed legal responses at the national level to
accommodate affected persons. At least for the Americas, this body of legal
practice robustly challenges the contention in much of the legal literature that
national law can simply be dismissed as irrelevant or as comprised merely of
isolated protection provisions in the national law of states in the Global North.
Rather, a broadly similar legal approach to these mobility challenges is evident in
national laws across this region, including among states in the Global South. On
the one hand, this existing practice raises a question about the role of international
law, and its added value to the existing response in this region, especially in light
of international efforts in some subregions to develop harmonized guidance on
such legal practice. On the other hand, given that it is states that are the creators
of international law, a better understanding of the ways in which they already see
the pertinent challenges, and respond to them in law, offers an insight into how
those existing views and practice might influence the development of international
law in the future.
In this respect, this Article establishes that most states in the Americas treat
the challenges principally as a matter of immigration law rather than international
protection. This is not to say that the latter body of law is not applied where
environmental events unleash persecution or violence, but simply that it is done
by reference to the latter phenomena, rather than the disasters themselves. In
general, though, the travel, entry, and stay of persons affected by environmental
threats is resolved not by application of the law on international protection—nor
that on the environment—but by immigration law and cooperation with the state
of origin. For persons with a link to the destination country, ordinary migration
categories offer a pathway for mobility and a criterion for differentiation among
the wider universe of migrants, the importance of which is often overlooked in
the legal literature. The fact that states have been prepared to flexibly apply these
categories to disaster-affected persons, in contrast to the rigid application of
refugee law, indicates how strongly states see immigration law as the appropriate
medium of response. Even for those who lack such a link with the destination
country, a surprisingly wide range of states have used exceptional migration
categories in immigration law, and similar provisions for humanitarian discretion
in national refugee law, to facilitate entry and stay for affected persons. In both
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cases, the pertinent criterion is usually that the individual is “seriously and directly
affected” by the disaster. Immigration law may be largely overlooked by the legal
literature, since it is not well-established in international law, but, in practice, it
represents the main framework for response by states in the Americas.
What, then, of international law? As this Article demonstrates, at least in the
Americas, the problem is not an absence of legal tools. Indeed, in this region, the
basic elements of the approach in national law have quite a high degree of
consistency. This raises the important question of whether similar legal practice
can be discerned in other regions of the world. Yet, for the development of
international law, even this discrete body of national legal practice in the Americas
raises the prospect that these provisions provide evidence of emerging norms of
“regional” custom,280 and they are already influencing policy at the global level.
That consistency is seen also in how the existing national practice has been
distilled and elaborated in soft law frameworks at the subregional level as a means
to harmonize the approach in participating states. Looking to the future, this
suggests that grand proposals for new global treaties on international protection
or environmental law to address the legal implications of such mobility are less
likely to gain traction with states in this region than efforts to develop the existing
approach in international immigration law at the regional or subregional levels. In
some forums, incorporating elements of the current approach into free movement
arrangements looks like a distinct possibility.281 Overall, then, it seems that
international law may still have a role to play in shaping the response to
international mobility linked to environmental factors. However, for better or
worse, in the Americas and elsewhere, its future development seems more likely
to build on existing state practice than on the flights of fancy of us international
law scholars. The law offers few truly blank canvases.

280

The fact that these provisions are rooted in the discretion of states to regulate their immigration
affairs may raise a question about whether such legal practice truly reflects opinio juris, as an element
of international custom. However, the codification in national law of a power to favorably resolve
these types of cases, and its exercise in practice by the state concerned according to the terms of its
law, may suggest that states perceive the creation of such powers as a matter of legal obligation. For
discussion of the concept of “regional” or “particular,” as opposed to “general” international
custom, see Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, at 154–56, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018).
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This analysis is bolstered by a recent example of practice from outside the Americas region. In
February 2020, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an African subregional
interstate forum took precisely this step, endorsing a free movement agreement that integrates
specific immigration-based provisions that require states parties to allow citizens of fellow IGAD
member states to enter their territory “in anticipation of, during or in the aftermath of disaster,”
and to facilitate the extension of stay for such disaster-affected persons while return to their country
of origin “is not possible or reasonable.” See Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD
Region, Feb. 25, 2020, art. 16 (awaiting entry into force).
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